Estates of Deceased Persons—Decree of Distribution—Effect of Omnibus Clause.—A provision in a decree distributing the estate of a deceased person, to the effect that any other property not now-known or discovered, which may belong to said estate, or in which the estate may have an interest, is distributed to a specified person, is sufficient to pass whatever interest the deceased had at the time of his death in property not specifically mentioned in the decree.

Deeds — Conditions Subsequent — Construction.—Conditions subsequent in deeds are not favored in law because they tend to destroy estates, and no provision in a deed relied on to create a condition subsequent will be so interpreted if the language of the provision will bear any other reasonable construction.

Id.—Creation of Conditions Subsequent—Forfeiture Clause.—It is not essential to the creation of a condition subsequent that a forfeiture clause should be inserted, such as that a failure to comply with the condition will render the conveyance null and void, and the premises shall revert to the grantor, though some such clause would appear to be extremely desirable and in some eases absolutely necessary for the purpose of showing clearly and unmistakably the intent of the grantor.

Id.—Use of Words “On Condition”—Intent of Parties.—While no precise form of words is necessary to create a condition subsequent still it must be created by express terms or by clear implication. The words “on condition that,” are apt and appropriate words, both in their technical and popular sense, to create the condition, and such words ex proprio vigore import such condition, in the ah""nco of other language inconsistent therewith. The mere use of such words, however, will not necessarily import such condition, when the intent of the parties, as gathered from an examination of the whole instrument, is otherwise.

Id.—Deed to Charitable Corporation—-Condition Subsequent not Created.—The deed in question- was made to a corporation, named the Victoria Hospital Association, formed solely for the charitable purposes, as stated in its articles of incorporation, “to provide medical attendance and medicines, and hospital accommodations, for the sick; to establish and conduct an hospital to be known as the Victoria Hospital; to acquire, buy, sell or encumber real estate or other property in connection with the objects of the association; to take charge of the property thereof; and generally -to do and perform, in accordance with the law and the by-laws thereof, all and every act and thing requisite or desirable to carry out the objects of the association.” The deed recited tha-t “for the consideration hereinafter stated,” the grantor gave to the grantee, “its successors and assigns forever,” a lot of land in the city and county of San Francisco, one hundred feet square, “to have and to hold the said premises unto said party of the second part, its successors and assigns forever.” Following the habendum, and tenendum, clause was this provision. “This deed is made upon the express condition and for -the consideration that the said real property hereby conveyed and the income therefrom, shall be used by the said party of the second part for benevolent purposes and in all respects in compliance with the objects for which said party of the second part is formed, pursuant to its articles of incorporation. ... It is hereby provided that the hospital to be erected on the land be named the Victoria Memorial Hospital.” Seld, that the deed did not manifest an intent on the part of the grantor to express a condition affeeting the title to the land, and that, notwithstanding the use of the words “upon the express condition,” the whole instrument fairly expresses the intention on the part of the grantor to convey the property absolutely to the grantee in consideration of its mere promise to use the same for the purposes specified, being all the purposes for which the grantee was organized and exists, and that the provision was nothing more than a covenant on the part of the grantee to the effect that the property will be so used.

Id.—Deed Does not Create Trust in Land.—Such conveyance, being in substance an absolute grant to the corporation for all its corporate purposes, the residuary devisee of the grantor did not acquire any contingent reversionary interest in the land, based upon the theory that a trust was created thereby.

Id.—Dissolution on Charitable Corporation—Reversion op Land to Donor—Donor Retains Mere Possibility not Coupled With Interest.—Assuming the existence in this state of the rule that the real estate of a charitable corporation reverts or escheats to the donor upon its dissolution, the donor, during the existence of the corporation and while it owns the land, is without any legal interest therein. He has at most only a mere possibility, not coupled with an interest. Whatever legal interest in the property he may ever have, on this account, will be created only by the dissolution of the corporation at a time when it still owns the land.

Id.—McEnerney Act—Decree Need not Determine Possibility op Donor.—In a proceeding by such corporation, under the so-called McEnerney Act, to establish its title to the land so conveyed, it is necessary to ascertain and determine only existing interests, and a decree establishing its title will not bar the assertion of the interest subsequently acquired by a reverter upon the dissolution of the corporation at a time when it still owns the land.