The plaintiff brought seven separate suits for the purpose of recovering from the treasurer of the state of California taxes paid by it under protest. The taxes were levied at the rate of either three or four per cent upon the gross receipts from the business of the plaintiff transacted in the state of California. The rate is fixed and the tax authorized by section 14, article XIII, of the constitution of California, amended in 1910, and statutes passed in pursuance thereof. Approximately fifty per cent of the gross revenue of the plaintiff corporation in California consists of returns from the interstate business of the plaintiff corporation. The amount of the California revenue derived from interstate business is ascertained by apportioning to the business in the state of California the proportion of the fare derived from each item of the business of the plaintiff, into, out of, and through the state of California, which the mileage traveled by the passenger in California bears to the total mileage traveled by him upon his ticket, and by adding these several amounts to ascertain the total amount of gross receipts for the year for such business. These amounts were furnished to the state board of equalization, and are as follows:

In considering the effect of this method of apportionment of the passenger fares derived from interstate business, it should be observed in passing that, if the rates of the plaintiff corporation for long interstate hauls are less proportionately per mile than for shorter hauls in intrastate business, it follows that if two passengers proceed from San Francisco to the state line at Yuma, one going to New York or Boston by the way of New Orleans and the other stopping at the state line, the amount of fare apportioned to the state of California would be less in the case of the traveler who is going to Boston or New York than in the ease of the one who stops at the state line. If the state is entitled to levy a tax in the manner adopted, this would seem to be the fairest method of apportioning the receipts of an interstate common carrier. If the same system was adopted in all the states traversed by the carrier, the sum of the amounts thus apportioned to the several states would be equal to the gross receipts of the carrier derived from such interstate commerce.

Appellant’s contention is that a tax upon the gross receipts derived from interstate commerce is in violation of the federal constitution giving Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, and for that reason seeks to recover the proportion of the tax which is based upon the gross receipts derived from interstate commerce.

[1] It is apparently conceded by the appellant that the gross receipts of a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce can be considered as a basis in a bona fide effort to determine the value of the carrier’s property within the state, and that if the value so derived from the consideration of these gross receipts from interstate commerce and from intrastate commerce is the fair valuation of the property within the state subject to taxation, that the tax is valid. If not so conceded, it is clear that snch a tax is valid. (Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379 , [ 48 L. Ed. 229 , 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 107, see, also, Rose’s U. S. Notes].)

The section of the California constitution authorizing and levying the tax declares that it is a property tax in lieu of all other taxes, state, county and municipal, and if this declaration is a true statement of the fact, it is undoubtedly true that the method is unobjectionable. The constitution, after enumerating the various companies which are required to pay the tax levied under its provision, requires that they “(a) ... shall annually pay to the state a tax upon their franchises, roadways, roadbeds, rails, rolling stock, poles, wires, pipes, canals, conduits, rights of way, and other property, or any part thereof, used exclusively in the operation of their business in this state, computed as follows: Said tax shall be equal to the percentages hereinafter fixed upon the gross receipts from operation of such companies and each thereof within this state. . . . Such taxes shall be in lieu of all other taxes and licenses, state, county and municipal, upon the property above enumerated of such companies except as otherwise in this section provided. . . . All property enumerated in subdivision a [supra], b and d of this section shall be subject to taxation, in the maimer provided by law to pay the principal and interest of any bonded indebtedness created and outstanding by any city, city and county, county, town, township or district, before the adoption of this section. The taxes so paid for principal and interest on such bonded indebtedness shall be deducted from the total amount paid in taxes for state purposes. ...”

[2] The question as to whether or not the taxes levied by section 14, article XIII of the constitution are taxes upon property rather than upon receipts or income has several times been considered by this court and in each instance it has been declared to be essentially a property tax.

The opinion in City and County of San Francisco v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 Cal. 244 , [ 135 Pac. 971 ], gives a history of the enactment of section 14, article XIII of the constitution, to which we refer without repeating the same herein. With reference to the nature of the tax it was therein stated:

In the opinion in the case of Lake Tahoe Ry. etc. Co. v. Roberts, 168 Cal. 551 , [Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1196, 143 Pac. 786 ], it is said: “The fact that these manifest contingencies have not been provided for by law is additional evidence that the framers of the constitution meant what they said, namely, that only property used exclusively, or only a sever-able part of property used exclusively in the operation of the business of the company, should be included in the list of property whose sole and only tax is covered by the gross revenue percentage, and that the earnings of other properties not so exclusively used in whole or in part are not an element in the admeasurement of this tax.” (Italics ours.)

In the opinion in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Roberts, 168 Cal. 420 , [ 143 Pac. 700 ], additional history of the constitutional amendment is set out on page 423, to which we refer, and the decisions of the supreme court of the United States on this subject are thus summarized:

While we have not heretofore considered the proposition from the standpoint of its relation to interstate commerce, it is clear from the foregoing that this court has always considered the tax to be in fact what it purports to be, namely, a tax upon the property of the company as it is described in the constitution and with more particularity in the assessment by the state board of equalization.

The validity of such a tax from the standpoint of the interstate commerce clause of the federal constitution, as interpreted by the supreme court of the United States, received careful consideration from the commissioners, who were appointed to formulate and report upon the proposed system of taxation. Before the appointment of these commissioners, in pursuance of an act of the legislature authorizing such a body to be formed, the supreme court of the United States in a number of cases had considered whether or not certain forms of state legislation authorizing the taxation of interstate commerce transportation companies was a valid exercise of the power of the state. The reports of the commission show that these cases were considered by them in formulating their plan of taxation and that an effort was made to conform to the then latest expression of the supreme court of the United States upon the subject. A quotation from Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379 , [ 48 L. Ed. 229 , 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 107, see, also, Rose’s U. S. Notes], supra, decided in 1903, will indicate the principle upon which the tax commission relied in the drafting of the constitutional amendment, which was afterward submitted to the state legislature and by the legislature submitted to the people for adoption. The court was considering the validity of a statute of Michigan levying a specific tax upon the property and business of every railroad corporation operated in the state. That statute provided that “when the railroad lies partly within and partly without this state, prima facie, the gross income of said company from such road for the purposes of taxation shall be on the actual earnings of the road in Michigan, computed by adding to the income derived from the business transacted by said company entirely within this state, such proportion of the income of said, company arising from the interstate business as the length of the road over which said interstate business is carried in this state bears to the entire length of the road over which said interstate business is carried. ’ ’

The court in disposing of the contention that the statute was an invalid interference with interstate commerce said: “We need say but a word in answer to the suggestion that the tax is an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce. In form the tax is a tax on ‘the property and business of such railroad corporation operated within the state, ’ computed upon certain percentages of gross income. The prima facie measure of the plaintiff’s gross income is substantially- that which was approved in Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217, 228 , [ 35 L. Ed. 994 , 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121], See, also, Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. 1 , [ 41 L. Ed. 49 , 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1054]. Decree affirmed. ’ ’

A decision (Galveston etc. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217 , [ 52 L. Ed. 1031 , 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638]), rendered later (1907), was also available before the legislature or the people finally acted upon the proposed plan of taxation. In that case it was said: “So it has been held that a tax on the property and business of a railroad operated within the state might be estimated prima facie by gross income, computed by adding to the income derived from business within the state the proportion of interstate business equal to the proportion between the road over which the business was carried within the state to the total length of the road over which it was carried. (Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379 , [ 48 L. Ed. 229 , 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 107].)”

Of course, the fact that the constitutional provision assailed by the appellant purports to levy a tax upon the property and to consider the gross receipts solely as a basis for the valuation thereof is not necessarily determinative of the question, however persuasive and definite such a declaration may be.

[3] The question as to whether or not a particular taxing law violates the federal constitution depends upon the practical operation and the effect of the tax imposed and not upon the definitions or declarations of the state authorities. The rule is thus stated in the recent case of Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 , [ 64 L. Ed. 445 , 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221]: “For, where the question is whether a state taxing law contravenes rights secured by that instrument, the decision must depend not upon any mere question of form, construction, or definition, but upon the practical operation and effect of the tax imposed. (St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 362 , [ 59 L. Ed. 265 , 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 99]; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 237 , [Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642, 61 L. Ed. 685 , 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 260]; Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292, 294 , [ 62 L. Ed. 295 , 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 126]; American Mfg. Co, v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459, 463 , [ 63 L. Ed. 1084 , 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522].) The practical burden of a tax imposed upon the net income derived by a nonresident from a business carried on within the state certainly is no greater than that of a tax upon the conduct of the business, and this the state has the lawful power to impose, as we have seen.”

To the same efféct is the case of American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, supra, where it is said: “As a matter of construction, this, upon familiar principles, is conclusive upon us. But, as has been held very often, the question whether a state law or a tax imposed thereunder deprives a party of rights secured by the federal constitution depends not upon the form of the act, nor upon how it is construed or characterized by the state court, but upon its practical operation and effect. (St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 362 , [ 59 L. Ed. 265 , 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 99]; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 237 , [Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642, 61 L. Ed. 685 , 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 260] ; Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292, 294 , [ 62 L. Ed. 295, 38 .Sup. Ct. Rep. 126].)”

Before considering the effect of our new constitutional scheme of taxation upon interstate commerce, we cite some of the decisions of the supreme court of the United States on the subject, rendered since the system was adopted by this state. The decision of that court in Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275 , [ 63 L. Ed. 602 , 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276], dealt with a statute of Georgia wherein that state had provided for the levying of a tax upon the interstate commerce of the Union Tank Line Company, based upon the proportion that the miles in Georgia over which the cars of that company moved bore to the total miles so traversed in all the states. It is to be observed that the plan did not consider “cars mileage,” or “ton mileage,” or “receipts,” or “revenue,”, either gross or net, for such haulage, as is pointed out in the opinion holding the tax invalid, from which we quote as follows:

It is worthy of note that three members of the supreme court considered that even this method of assessment was a valid exercise of the state taxing power as theretofore determined by the supreme court. The opinion of the minority is thus stated by Mr. Justice Pitney, Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Clarke concurring:

The appellant relies very strongly upon a recent decision of that court, Galveston etc. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217 , [ 52 L. Ed. 1031 , 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638], in which a tax of one per cent of their gross receipts is levied upon all railroads operating in the state. The tax was held invalid. As we understand the main opinion in that case, the court concluded that the Texas statute taxed all revenue of such interstate commerce carrier actually received within the state without regard to the proportion earned in the state, although in some cases the larger part of their gross receipts is derived from the carriage of passengers and freight coming from, or destined to, other points without the state. The tax was regarded by the majority of that court as a tax upon the gross receipts derived from interstate commerce, and in addition to ad valorem taxes upon a valuation of their property “taken as a going concern.” The minority of the court, Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice McKenna held that the tax should be sustained as an occupation tax, levied by the state law as interpreted by the' supreme court of Texas as applicable only to the proportion of the interstate commerce gross receipts, apportioned to the mileage traveled thereby in Texas, in proportion to the total mileage traveled. The main opinion recognizes and is based upon the principles of such taxation theretofore established, and relied upon by the people of this state in adopting the new method of taxa tion, as will be apparent from the following quotation therefrom: “It being once admitted, as of course it must be, that not every law that affects commerce among the states is a regulation of it in a constitutional sense, nice distinctions are to be expected. Regulation and commerce among the states both are practical rather than technical conceptions, and, naturally, their limits must be fixed by practical lines. As the property of companies engaged in such commerce may be taxed (Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 , [ 35 L. Ed. 613 , 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 876]), and may be taxed at its value as it is, in its organic relations, and not merely as a congeries of unrelated items, taxes on such property have been sustained that took account of the augmentation of value from the commerce in which it was engaged. (Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194 , [ 41 L. Ed. 683 , 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 305]; S, C., 166 U. S. 185 , [ 41 L. Ed. 965 , 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 604]; Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490, 499 , [ 48 L. Ed. 761 , 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 498].) So it has been held that a tax on the property and business of a railroad operated within the state might be estimated prima facie by gross income, computed by adding to the income derived from business within the state the proportion of interstate business equal to the proportion between the road over which the business was carried within the state to the total length of the road over which it was carried. (Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379 , [ 48 L. Ed. 229 , 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 107].)

“Since the commercial value of property consists in the expectation of income from it, and since taxes ultimately, at least in the long run, come out of income, obviously taxes called taxes on property 'and those called taxes on income or receipts tend to run into each other somewhat as fair value and anticipated profits run into each other in the law of damages. The difficulty of distinguishing them became greater when it was decided, not without much debate and difference of opinion, that interstate carriers’ property might be taxed as a going concern. In Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers, supra, the measure of property by income purported only to be prima facie valid. But the extreme case came earlier. In Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217 , [ 35 L. Ed. 994 , 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121], ‘an annual excise tax for the privilege of exercising its franchise, ’ was levied upon every one operating a railroad in the state, fixed by percentages, varying up to a certain limit, upon the average gross receipts per mile multiplied by the number of miles within the state when the road extended outside. This seems at first sight libe a reaction from the Philadelphia, & Southern Mail Steamship Company case. But it may not have been. The estimated gross receipts per mile may be said to have been made a measure of the value of the property per mile. That the effort of the state was to reach that value and not to fasten on the receipts from transportation as such was shown by the fact that the scheme of the statute was to establish a system. The buildings of the railroad and its lands and fixtures outside of its right of way were to be taxed locally, as other property was taxed, and this excise with the local tax were to be in lieu of all taxes. The language shows that the local tax was not expected to include the additional value gained by the property being part of a going concern. That idea came in later. The excise was an attempt to reach that additional value. The two taxes together fairly may be called a commutation tax. (See Ficklen v. Taxing District of Shelby County, 145 U. S. 1, 23 , [ 36 L. Ed. 601 , 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 810]; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 697 , [ 39 L. Ed. 311 , 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 360]; McHenry v. Alford, 168 U. S. 651, 670, 671 , [ 42 L. Ed. 614 , 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 242].)

“ ‘By whatever name the exaction may be called, if it amounts to no more than the ordinary tax upon property or a just equivalent therefor, ascertained by reference thereto, it is not open to attack as inconsistent with the constitution. ’ (Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 697 , [ 39 L. Ed. 311 , 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 360]. See New York etc. R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U. S. 431, 438, 439 , [ 39 L. Ed. 1043 , 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 896].) The question is whether this is such a tax. It appears sufficiently, perhaps from what has been said, that we are to look for a practical rather than a logical or philosophical distinction. The state must be allowed to tax the property and to tax it at its actual value as a going concern. On the other hand, the state cannot tax the interstate business. The two necessities hardly admit of an absolute logical reconciliation. Yet the distinction is not without sense. When a legislature is trying simply to value property, it is less likely to attempt to or effect injurious regulation than when it is aiming directly at the receipts from interstate commerce. A practical line can be drawn by taking the whole scheme of taxation into account. That must be done by this court as best it can. Neither the state courts nor the legislatures, by giving the tax a particular name or by the use of some form of words, can take away our duty to consider its nature and effect. If it bears upon commerce among the states so directly as to amount to a regulation in a relatively immediate way, it will not be saved by name or form. (Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U. S. 27, 37 , [ 46 L. Ed. 785 , 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 576] ; Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251, 254, 256 , [14 Ann. Cas. 1101, 52 L. Ed. 778 , 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485].)”

That the Texas case just quoted is not decisive of the case at bar is made apparent by a later decision of the supreme court of the United States much relied upon by respondent, wherein a law of Minnesota is sustained, requiring car-loaning companies to pay a tax upon their gross earnings within the state, in lieu of other taxes on the property. The matter is discussed as follows in the opinion (Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450 -452, [ 62 L. Ed. 827 , 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 373]) :

The decision in this case is clear authority for the system of taxation incorporated in our constitution, and “the local view” concerning the same embodied in that constitution and the statutes and court decisions defining its purpose and scope.

In a still later case the system adopted by California was apparently applied by the state authorities of Nevada, and sustained by the supreme court of the United States. (State v. Wells Fargo & Co., 38 Nev. 505, 540 , [ 150 Pac. 836 ]; Wells Fargo & Co. v. Nevada, 248 U. S. 165 , [ 63 L. Ed. 190 , 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62].) The valuation of eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars was sustained as a reasonable valuation, regardless of the method used in ascertaining its value. A valuation of three hundred dollars per mile was placed upon the business of the express company. This involved a capitalization of eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars, which was taken as the value for taxation. In connection with this valuation the supreme court of Nevada made the following statement: “Whether the system of determining the valuation of appellant’s property, applied by the state board of assessors, was correct or not, it does not appear that: it operated to impose an excessive valuation. The fact that erroneous methods may in good faith have been used to determine valuations is immaterial) we think, if an excessive valuation did not result therefrom.” The supreme court of the United States affirmed the decision of the Nevada court (Wells Fargo & Co. v. Nevada, 248 U. S. 165 , [ 63 L. Ed. 190 , 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62]), stating: “As construed by the state- court, the statute under which the tax was imposed does not provide for a privilege or franchise tax, but only for an ad valorem property tax. Acting under the statute, a state board valued the company’s personal property, tangible and intangible, used in its express business within the state, at three hundred dollars per mile of line; . . . the assessor of Humboldt County . . . inaccurately described the property as consisting of the right to carry on express business there.

“Looking only at that entry there is strong ground for saying that the tax was laid on the privilege or act of doing an express business which was principally interstate. On the other hand, the action of the state board, on which the assessment concededly was predicated, indicates that what was taxed was the company’s property in Humboldt County. The difference is vital, for, consistently with the commerce clause of the federal constitution, the state could not tax the privilege or act of engaging in interstate commerce, but could tax the company’s property within the state, although chiefly employed in such commerce. (Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 220 , [ 32 L. Ed. 94 , 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1037]; S. C., 166 U. S. 185, 218 , [ 41 L. Ed. 965 , 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 604]; Galveston etc. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 225-227 , [ 52 L. Ed. 1031 , 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638]; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450, 453 , [ 62 L. Ed. 827 , 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 373].)

“ The company insists that the state is concluded by the entry on the assessment-roll. But the state court, as shown in its opinion, rejects that view and holds, in effect, that the entry must be construed in the light of the statute and the action of the state board, and that when this is done it is apparent that the tax was not laid on the privilege or act of engaging in interstate commerce, but on the company’s property within the county. We perceive no ground for disturbing that ruling. In so far as it turns on the authority of the state board and the assessor under the statute and the relative effect to be given to their acts it is not reviewable here, and in so far as it relates to what really was the subject of the tax we think it was right. (See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, supra, p. 454.) Evidently the company at one time took this view of the tax, for in an amendment to its answer we find an allegation that the state board ‘valued the property used by this defendant at the rate or sum of three hundred dollars for every mile of railroad over which this defendant transacted business, and apportioned said assessment or tax to the various counties of the state in accordance with the number of miles of such railroads, so situated within said county, and that the tax herein sued for was not otherwise levied or assessed. ’ . . .

[4] It follows from the foregoing decisions that it is proper to consider, as a basis on which to establish the value of plaintiff’s property in this state, the earnings derived from its property, tangible and intangible, within the state; and that it is proper to consider the proportion of its receipts derived from its interstate business, earned within the state as an element of that basis. [5] It is also clear that the system adopted by our state constitution for such apportionment of interstate earnings is the fairest possible method of such apportionment, and that by such method the state does not assert jurisdiction over any earnings from the interstate business, not actually derived from that portion of such business actually conducted within the state, and does not draw to itself earnings derived from capital or property elsewhere situated. In short, that the method adopted for the ascertainment of local values is wholly unobjectionable.

The appellant advances one other argument in support of its contention that the constitutional system of taxation is in reality a tax upon the gross revenues derived in part from interstate commerce and not a tax upon the appellant’s property. The contention may best be stated in the words of the appellant: “The facts regarding what was done refute completely the claim set up by the defendant in his answer and found by the court that the property was taxed at all. It was the gross receipts and gross receipts only.” The claim is that the reports of the state board of equalization and assessment by them of appellant’s property make manifest that the tax in question is not a property tax. For the purpose of considering appellant’s contention it will be necessary to consider the method of fixing the rate or percentage of gross receipts (three per cent and later four per cent) used in determining the tax.

Before the new scheme was recommended hearings were had before this commission and all transportation companies, including plaintiff, doing business in this state were given an opportunity to present their views and their data upon the subject. It is, perhaps, worthy of note that the report of the commission shows that the plaintiff then stated that it was unable to comply with the request of the commission for information as to the proportion of its interstate business conducted in California and contented itself with a protest against any form of taxation which operated to place a burden upon its interstate commerce.

The tax commission in its report of 1906 to the legislature furnished the proper rate of taxation based on the gross receipts in order to properly tax the property of the various corporations involved in the amendment, as follows, to wit:

The commission of 1906 also shows in its report the close approximation between the value of railroad property as theretofore assessed by the state board of equalization for taxation purposes, and the value to be ascertained by the proposed system. That portion of the report is as follows:

“The question of the equity of the gross earnings tax as between different roads can be tested somewhat roughly by comparing the taxes now paid on the ad valorem plan with the taxes that would be paid on the gross earnings plan. This is done in the following table for the more important railroad systems of the state. It is not argued that the present system is equitable as between the different roads, but it affords the easiest and most readily available basis of comparison :

The similarity of values derived by the assessment of individual items of property, and by adding such items and thus ascertaining the total value, and the system inaugurated by the constitution, can he determined by a comparison of the assessment of plaintiff’s properties by the two methods for the same years. The use of the two methods of valuation resulted from the adoption of a constitutional amendment in 1910 requiring a tax to be levied upon all the property of the state for the Panama-Pacific Exposition.

While the discrepancies between these two valuations is pointed out by the plaintiff as an evidence of the inequality and excess of the percentage tax, the analysis of the figures by the attorney-general shows that the valuations of the plaintiff’s property, ascertained by the two methods, were practically identical. In considering these figures, however, it is important to bear in mind that while the law directs that all property shall be assessed at its full cash value, as a matter of fact experience has shown that the assessed value is less than 50 per cent of the actual value, or, to be more accurate, and use the figures of the state board of equalization in 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1914, the assessed value was 45.1 per cent of the actual value; in 1915, 41.991 per cent; 1916, 42.755 per cent.

If the state board of equalization had certified to the county assessors the true valuation of plaintiff’s property instead of the percentage of its value based upon the system of assessment adopted by the county assessors, the plaintiff’s property would ¡have borne an excessive proportion of the tax. As stated by the supreme court of the United States in Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350 , [ 62 L. Ed. 1154 , 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495], “it must be regarded as settled that intentional systematic undervaluation by state officials of other taxable property in the same class contravenes the constitutional right of one taxed upon the full value of his property.” This court has recognized such rule and has permitted a recovery of taxes levied upon such valuation. (Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 162 Cal. 164 , [9 A. L. R. 1277, 121 Pac. 381 ]; Southern Pacific Land Co. v. County of San Diego, 183 Cal. 543 , [ 191 Pac. 931 ].)

In making the comparisons of values another fact must also be considered, namely, that the gross revenue method includes all operative property (Const., art. XIII, see. 14), while the property valuation, by the state board of equalization, for taxation purposes according to the former plan excludes certain operative properties, which are separately assessed by the various local assessors.

For the purpose of comparison we will use the figures furnished by the attorney-general in his brief for plaintiff’s property:

To such item of undervaluation must be added the operative properties locally assessed. Expressed in terms of tax the comparison is compiled by the attorney-general from the reports of the state board of equalization, and is shown in the next table.

The foregoing tables will make it clear that the plaintiff has not been unfairly treated by the state, although it is well to note that the plaintiff in its complaints herein does not raise the issue of overvaluation and makes no allegation of excessive tax as compared with the value of property taxed. The valuations presented in plaintiff’s argument were all derived from the work of the officers of the state, and the figures are only relevant as showing that the state system of taxation was based in fact, as well as in name, upon the value of plaintiff’s property in the state, and as further illustrating that interstate commerce carriers have not been made to bear an undue proportion of the burden of taxation.

In view of our conclusion on this branch of the ease it-will be unnecessary to consider or determine the extent to which the taxing power of the state may be exercised in the event that the burden upon the property of interstate commerce carriers is out of all reasonable proportion to that imposed upon the property of others within the state.

[6] We cannot see that the validity of that portion of the act (Stats. 1911, pp. 530, 548, sec. 24), declaring a forfeiture of the right of a foreign corporation to do business in the state if taxes are not paid, is involved in this action to recover taxes already paid.

Judgment affirmed.

Olney, J., Sloane, J., Shaw, J., Angellotti, C. J., Lennon, J., and Lawlor, J., concurred.

“Expressed algebraically, let t equal the tax rate sought, n equal the percentage of net earnings to gross, i equal the interest rate on the investment, and r equal the given tax rate on property; then: n t = — x r. . . .