Supreme Court—Original Proceedings—Mandamus, Prohibition, and Certiorari—Transfer from District Court of Appeal—Jurisdiction.—The supreme court has jurisdiction to vacate the decision of a district court of appeal in an original proceeding in mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari and to transfer the proceeding to the supreme court for determination.

Id.—Petition for Transfer—Petitioner not a Party to the Becord— Power of Court on Its Own Motion.—It is immaterial that the petition for a transfer of such an original proceeding from a district court of appeal to the supreme court is made by one not a party to the record, since the supreme court has power t'o order the transfer on its own motion.

Id.—Effect of Order Transferring Proceeding—Power of Supreme Court After Transfer.—When an order transferring an original proceeding from the district court of appeal to the supreme court' is made after decision by the district court of appeal and within the time prescribed in the constitution, the matter is transferred to the supreme court for a determination of all material questions involved therein to the same extent as if originally instituted in the supreme court.

Id.—Practice on Granting Hearing—Matters Considered—Becord.— In considering petitions for hearing in the supreme court in such cases, the practice established by that court, in considering petitions for a hearing of appeals, required by the constitution to be taken to a district court of appeal, under which it will not look into the record, but will consider only the opinion of the district court of appeal, is confined to appeals, and does not' extend to original proceedings instituted in a district court' of appeal.

Street Improvements—Beassessment by City Council After Appeal by Property Owners—Assessment in Proportion to Benefits. In a street improvement proceeding under t'he Street Improvement Act of 1911 (Stats. 1911, p. 730), where on an appeal by certain property owners to review the assessment made by the superintendent of streets, the city council deducted from the assessment an amount equal to fifty cents a running foot on the lots of the appealing lot owners and added the gross amount of the deduction-to the assessment of the other lots in the district benefited, in such manner that the approximate increase on those lots amounted to $0.0006 per square foot of area, it does not follow that the assessment was not made by the council solely with reference to the benefit to each lot.

Id.—Finding of City Council—Effect.—Where the resolution of the city council required the street superintendent to assess the gross sum of the cost of the work and expenses (stating the amount) upon the several lots, “upon each respectively in proportion to the estimated benefits,” etc., and stated that the council “finds and decides and determines that said several lots . . . are benefited by said work and improvement in the proportions and in the amounts set forth” in a table of assessments therein set forth, the supreme court, in the face of such finding, unassailed by anything in the record, cannot in a proceeding in certiorari say that the assessment was not' made in accordance with the rule of apportionment prescribed by the statute.

Id.—Constitutional Law—Validity of Act of 1911—Assessment in Proportion to Benefits.—The Improvement Act of 1911 (Stat's. 1911, p. 730), providing in section 4 in effect that the city council may charge the expense of the work on the district declared in the resolution ' of intention to be “benefited by the work and improvement,” and providing in section 20 that it shall assess the cost of the work "upon the several lots ... in proportion to the estimated benefits to be received by each of said several lots,” is not unconstitutional.