Husband and Wife—Title in Wife—Construction of Code—Presumption—Amendment not Retroactive—Community Property. -—The amendment to section 164 of the Civil Code in 1889, creating a presumption in favor of, separate property where title is taken in the wife’s name, is not retroactive; and where the deed was taken in the wife’s name prior to that amendment the presumption is that she held it as community property, and the deed alone cannot show the contrary.

Id.—Separate Property of Wife.—In such case, in order to constitute the property so taken in her name the separate property of the wife, it must be shown either that it was purchased with her separate funds, or that it was given to her by the husband.

Id.—Gift by Husband—Finding Against Evidence.—Where the court found upon sufficient evidence that the property lived upon by husband and family and taken in the wife’s name, was acquired with community funds paid for by the husband; but further finds that the property was given to her by the husband, the latter finding must be deemed against the evidence where the husband, without conflict, testified that he bought it for a home, and did not intend to make a gift thereof to the wife, and no circumstances appear sufficient to justify the inference that it was her separate property, or to overcome the presumption that it was community property.

Id.—Circumstances not Overcoming Presumption.—The circumstances that the deed described the land as encumbered by a mortgage, to be paid by the grantee, where it was in fact fully paid by the husband with community funds, and that the property was insured in the wife’s name, and the loss was made payable to her, and that deeds of trust were executed by husband and wife to secure loans, with a proviso for re-conveyance to the wife, were none of them sufficient to overcome the presumption that the record title left in the wife’s name, was community property.

Id.—Effect of 'Insurance in Wife’s Name.—Where the house and lot standing in the wife’s name was not her separate property, the assumption that the insurance money was payable to her in the event of loss by fire, would not make the money her separate property, any more than the burnt house was such.

Id.—Termination of Deeds of Trust.—The provision for reconveyance, or any reconveyance actually made, could have no legal effect otherwise than to make the record title clear, since upon payment of the debt, the purposes of the trust ceased and the property at once, without a reconveyance, revested in the party or parties who had owned it before. The record title left in the wife, is no evidence that she held it .otherwise than as community property.

Id.—Claim of Separate Property by Wife—Purpose of Sale— Objection by Husband.—The claim by the wife that the property was hers, and that she was about to sell it, and the objection of the husband that she could not sell it unless he signed .the deed, cannot be construed as an admission on his part that the land was her separate property, or that she had the right to sell it.

Id.—Husband not Estopped against Wife’s Grantee—Provision for Surplus on Sale by Trustee.—The husband is not estopped as against the grantee of the wife by a mere provision in the deeds of trust that in case of sale by the trustees, the surplus, if any, should De paid to the wife, from claiming the property as community property against such grantee, where the latter knew that his grantor was a married’woman and was bound to ascertain, at his peril, whether the property was community property, and he did not rely upon any statement made by the husband, but relied upon the wife’s warranty of title in her deed, it being matter of common knowledge that such deeds are unusual in this state.