Negligence—Street Railway—Accident to Pedestrian Crossing Track—Reliance on Ordinance Limiting Speed.—In an action against a street railway company to recover for personal injuries tó a pedestrian resulting from a collision with one of its ears, which occurred while the plaintiff in broad daylight was attempting to cross the car-track in front of the approaching car which she plainly saw, it is error to instruct the jury that the plaintiff had the right to assume, until she knew to the contrary, that the defendant would not violate the city ordinance limiting the speed of the cars.

Id.—Duty of Pedestrian Crossing Track.—A pedestrian about to cross a street in front of an approaching car has no right to omit any of the precautions which the law demands, nor to rely upon the strict compliance by the servants of the railway company with the speed laws.

Id.—Knowledge of Approaching Car—Failure to Sound Warning.— If the pedestrian was aware of the approach of the car, the failure of the railway company to sound an alarm has no causal connection with the accident, and becomes immaterial with respect to its negligence.

Id.—Last Clear Chance—Knowledge of Plaintiff’s Position of Peril—Failure of Motorman to Use Ordinary Care.—An instruction which, after defining the expression “last clear chance,” in effect told the jury that if the motorman saw the plaintiff in such a position that an ordinarily prudent person would have known that she was in danger of being injured, and he then failed to use ordinary care in an effort to avoid injuring her, they should measure the company’s liability by the rule of “last clear chance,” is in harmony with such rule, which is based not upon opportunity by the exercise of common prudence to observe the danger in which another has placed himself, but upon actual knowledge of sueli peril.

Id.—Evidence—Time of Discovery of Plaintiff’s Position of Peril. In such action, the motorman of the colliding car should have been permitted to testify when he first discovered that the plaintiff was in danger from his car. His belief and knowledge were relevant facts.

Ib.—Plea of Contributory Negligence.—A plea of contributory negligence, which is set up not merely in denial of the allegations of the complaint but as “a further, separate, and distinct answer and defense,” is sufficient.