Appeal prom Judgment—Review op Evidence.—On an appeal from a judgment taken within sixty days after its rendition and entry, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may be reviewed as effectually as upon an appeal from an order refusing a new trial. This is so where the appeal is taken under section 940 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as well as where it is taken under the new method prescribed by sections 941a, 941b, and 941c of that Code.

Id.—Record on Appeal—Reporter’s Transcript—Bill of Exceptions. In preparing the record on appeal, whether it be taken under the old or the new method, the appellant may follow the method prescribed by section 953a of that code, which provides that the reporter’s transcript, authenticated by the judge, shall be a part of the judgment-roll, and that it may be used on appeal instead of a bill of exceptions.

Id.—Insufficiency of Evidence to Sustain Bindings—Specifications of Particulars not Necessary in Reporter’s Transcript.—As such transcript, in a civil case, is required to include all the evidence taken, there is no occasion that it should contain any specifications of particulars in which the evidence is alleged to be insufficient to support the findings, and the code does not require them to be inserted therein. The insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings may be urged on appeal without making or filing any specifications in the trial court.

Corporation—Subscription to Stock—Specific Performance of Contract—Statute of Limitations.—Where a written contract of subscription to the capital stock of a corporation provided that the certificate for the stock should be delivered to the subscriber upon his making full payment therefor, the right of action of the subscriber to specifically enforce the contract accrued immediately upon his making such payment, and became barred four years thereafter, under subdivision 1 of section 337 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Id.—Contract Contemplating Pooling of Stock.—A pooling agreement referred to in such contract, in accordance with which the stock was to be held and voted, would have been no defense to such an action, where no such agreement was in existence at the time of the contract, and no steps were ever taken to create the contemplated pool.

Id.—Certificate to be Held by Corporation as Trustee for Subscriber—Breach of Trust by Corporation Known to Subscriber. If, however, by mutual consent of the parties, the time of issuing the certificate was deferred indefinitely after the payment of the price either until such pool should be formed or until the certificate was demanded by the subscriber, so that an express trust arose between the subscriber and the company, whereby the company became trustee of the stock for him for an indefinite period which would be terminated by the formation of the pool and the issuance of the stock accordingly, or upon a demand by the subscriber for the stock, the statute of limitations applicable to an action to enforce the trust is section 343 of the Code of Civil Procedure, fixing four years as the period of limitations. In such a ease, the statute did not begin to run until there had been a breach of the trust by the corporation which was known to the subscriber. The mere neglect of the company to issue the certificate, or of the subscriber to demand or compel such issuance, did not set the statute in motion.

Id.—Evidence of Repudiation of Trust—Knowledge of Repudiation by Foreign Administrator—-Action Barred by Statute of Limitations.—In the present case the evidence is held sufficient to show that, more than five years before the commencement of the action, the corporation repudiated such trust relation by issuing and making various transfers of the certificates of stock in violation of the terms of the trust, and that such repudiation then became known to the plaintiff, who was a foreign administrator and one of the heirs of the subscriber, and that consequently, the action, if considered as one to enforce the trust, was barred by the statute of limitations.

Id.—Notice of Repudiation Sufficient to Start Statute.—After the death of such subscriber, who was a nonresident of this state, it was not necessary, in order to constitute a repudiation of the trust sufficient to start the statute of limitations, that notice of such repudiation should be brought home to some person who had capacity immediately to begin an action in this state to enforce the trust.

Id.—Duty of Foreign Administrator to Enforce Trust—Notice of Repudiation—Procuring Ancillary Administration—Bringing Action Before Bar of Statute.—The domiciliary administrator of the estate of such subscriber had full power, and it was his duty, to accept performance of the trust, either in this state or elsewhere, and also to demand performance. If he was met with a failure or refusal, the breach of trust would be complete, and it would be his duty to take such steps as should 'be necessary to procure ancillary letters of administration in this state and bring the appropriate action before the statute of limitations had become a bar.

Id.—Running of Statute of Limitations—Death of Person Having Vested Right Before Breach—No Person in Being Capable of Maintaining Action.—"Where the person entitled to a right dies after the right vested but before a breach had made a cause of action thereon, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time of the breach, nowithstanding there is then no person in being capable of maintaining an action thereon.