This proceeding comes before this court after decision by the district court of appeal, second district, first division, Mr. Justice Houser having written the opinion for that court. We are in accord with said opinion in many respects and adopt and approve the following portion thereof:

“The findings made by the Commission, together with its order last mentioned, were as follows:

The employee Nelson testified as to his condition since sustaining the injury, and particularly as to his condition at the time of the hearing before the Commission. He in effect testified that he had not returned to work and that he had been unable to do any work since his injury; that he had visited his brother at his ranch in Minnesota and while there had assisted in the light chores when he felt well enough, such as driving the cattle and horses into the yard. As to having difficulty with his eye at the time he said: “Yes, lots of it, I cannot get the distance with it.” Doctor Pierce testified before the Commission that an “Examination of the mouth shows sinus opening above the right upper first molar, apparently from antrum. No sulcus behind the lower lid to hold artificial eye. There is a purulent discharge into the mouth. ” There was undoubtedly sufficient evidence before the Commission to justify the finding that total temporary disability of the employee had not terminated.

We also adopt and approve the further portion of the opinion of the district court of appeal:

“At the time the report of Dr. Pierce was made it appears therefrom that the condition of the employee was as follows:

“The operative treatment recommended by Dr. Pierce to which reference was made in the order by the Commission was indicated in the following language:

“Section 9 [a] of the Workmen’s Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act (Stats. 1917, p. 831, as variously amended) provides that:

“ ‘Where liability for compensation under this act exists, such compensation shall be furnished or paid by the employer and be as provided in the following schedule:

“On the part of the employer, the purpose of any surgical attempt in connection with an injury received by an employee is to restore him to as nearly a natural and normal condition as may be possible or practicable, to the end that his earning power by reason of his injury may be diminished to the least possible extent. To illustrate: If by accident arising from his employment the foot of a day laborer

should be so crushed that by no known surgical skill could it be made useful as a member of his body, the probable medical course and practice would indicate the amputation of the foot. In due course thereafter it is clear that an artificial foot would greatly aid the employee in bringing about a restoration to a considerable extent of his earning power. Could it be doubted that the language of the statute which requires the furnishing by the employer of such surgical treatment, ‘including artificial members’ as may be required to ‘cure and relieve from the effects of the injury,’ would be applicable? In the instant case, that the present appearance of the employee would be a decided handicap to his obtaining employment ‘in an open labor market’ is obvious. The evident purpose of some of the proposed surgical operations on the employee is to give him a more presentable personal appearance. In his present condition, by reason of his limitations and the natural competition in securing employment, it might, and in all probability would, be extremely difficult for the employee to secure even such work as he is capable of doing. If successful, the result of the proposed surgical operations would place the employee not only in a position where he could secure better and more remunerative employment than at this time he may command, but his improved personal appearance would assist in enabling him to retain such position. The probabilities are that the morale of the employee would be bettered and his self-respect and appreciation of his good-workmanship qualities be increased—all tending toward a rehabilitation and restoration of the earning powers of the employee as of the date of the injury which he sustained. The principle of the question here under consideration is treated to some extent in the case of New York Central R. R. Co. v. Bianc, 250 U. S. 596 [ 63 L. Ed. 1161 , 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44, see, also, Rose’s U. S. Notes Supp.] where, among other things, it is said:

“ This court is therefore led to the conclusion that even though conceding that the major object of the proposed surgical operations on the employee may be for ‘cosmetic purposes’ only, the respondent Commission in making its order therefor was not acting in excess of its statutory powers.

“ It is also objected by petitioner that ‘the Industrial Accident Commission acted without, or in excess of, its powers in ordering petitioner to pay bills covering operative treatment rendered Philip Nelson by private parties prior to a finding upon notice as provided in section 10 of the Workmen’s Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act, that petitioner’s approved hospital was inadequate.’ From an examination of the order by the Commission (hereinbefore set forth) relating to petitioner’s objection, it will be noted, not that the Commission has arbitrarily ordered the employer to pay bills covering operative treatment rendered to the employee prior to a finding that the hospital of petitioner was inadequate, but that in fact, the order was to the effect that the employer furnish the proposed operative treatment within a reasonable time, or on its neglect or refusal so to do, the employee ‘be entitled to secure such treatment from his own physician’ at the expense of the employer. The point made by petitioner, therefore, is without application to the facts herein. It may, however, be said that the record herein clearly discloses the fact that after twenty-two surgical operations on the employee, the employer admitted its inability to further relieve the employee from the effect of his injuries. Dr. Pierce, the evidence of whose surgical skill was admitted, promised the desired relief. In such circumstances, assuming the successful outcome of the proposed surgical operations, the case of Union Iron Works v. Industrial Accident Commission, 190 Cal. 33 [ 210 Pac. 410 ], is authority for the principle that the employer may be made liable for the necessary expense connected therewith.

“Finally, it is urged by petitioner that the respondent Commission acted in excess of its powers in refusing to furnish petitioner with a transcript of the hearing before the Commission.

“Without deciding whether in ordinary circumstances, upon payment by the petitioner of the fees prescribed by statute therefor, it became the duty of the Commission to furnish such transcript, this court is of the opinion that the relief sought is one that cannot be considered in a petition for writ of review. ...”

The award is affirmed.

Rehearing denied.