A hearing of the above-entitled cause was ordered before this court. After due consideration, we are satisfied with the opinion and decision of the court of appeal for the first district, by Presiding Justice Lennon, which is hereby adopted and made the decision of this court. It is as follows:

It is the contention of the plaintiff that the appeal from the order denying a new trial should be dismissed, because neither the notice of intention to move for a new trial nor the notice of appeal from the order denying a new trial was served upon any of the codefendants in the action against whom judgment was entered.

‘ ‘ This contention cannot be sustained. It is based upon the erroneous assumption that a new trial must be granted to all of the defendants against whom judgment was entered if it should be found that the appealing defendants are entitled to a new trial. It will be remembered that the appealing defendants ultimately unequivocally disclaimed any interest in the lands in controversy. Consequently they are interested in and complain solely of that phase of the judgment which calls for money damages against them as joint tort-feasors. It was the common law rule that the reversal of a judgment against several joint tort-feasors, and the granting of a new trial for error -committed to the prejudice of one defendant, necessitated a reversal of the judgment and the granting of a new trial as to all of the defendants. This rule, however, has been materially modified if not entirely superseded by the statutory rule in force in this jurisdiction. It is now the statutory rule in this state that if a judgment be given against several defendants who have been sued as joint tortfeasors, the judgment, if found to be erroneous as to any one of the defendants, may be vacated' as to that one only, and be continued in full force and effect as to the remaining defendants who have not appealed. (Code Civ. Proc., sees. 578 and 579; Nichols v. Dunphy, 58 Cal. 605 ; Cole v. Roebling Construction Co., 156 Cal. 443 , [ 105 Pac. 255 ]; Fowden v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 149 Cal. 151 , [ 86 Pac. 178 ]; Zibbel v. Southern Pac. Co., 160 Cal. 237 , [ 116 Pac. 513 ].)

“Incidentally the point is made upon the motion to dismiss that the notice of intention to move for a new trial was ineffectual because the intention as stated was ‘to move the above entitled court to vacate the judgment entered in the above entitled matter and to grant a new trial in said cause. ’ It is the plaintiff’s contention that inasmuch as the proceedings leading up to a new trial are initiated only by a motion to set aside the decision (Code Civ. Proc., see. 657), the notice of intention should have been ‘to vacate and set aside the decision. ’

“This point is without merit. The language of the notice of intention in the present case is identical with the language employed in the notice of intention given in the case of Locke v. Moulton, 96 Cal. 21 , [ 30 Pac. 957 ]. There the court in effect held that although the notice of intention did not in terms refer to the decision sought to be vacated, nevertheless the language employed effectively notified the prevailing party of the intention to move for a new trial which, if granted, necessarily would vacate the decision. This was held to be sufficient; and upon the authority of the case cited it must be held that the notice of intention in the present case was in all respects legally sufficient. (See, also, Hoover v. Wolfe, 167 Cal. 337 , [ 139 Pac. 794 ].)

“It follows from what has been said that the motion to dismiss must be denied.

“The judgment appealed from is assailed upon the ground that the evidence does not support some of the findings of fact made by the trial court, and also upon the ground that,' in so far as the remaining findings are supported by evidence, such findings do not in turn support and warrant the judgment rendered and entered against the defendants Tognazzini and. Swiss American Bank.

“We are satisfied that this contention must be sustained. The gist of plaintiff’s cause of action in so far as it controls the judgment for damages was in effect that the defendants Antonio and Bose Fodera, Bauer, Tognazzini, and Shawhan had unlawfully and wrongfully conspired to slander plaintiff’s title to the property described in the complaint; and that in pursuance of such conspiracy each of said defendants, with the knowledge and consent of one another, falsely represented and pretended, by the means and methods herein-before narrated, that they had some claim upon the plaintiff’s lands. It will be noted in passing that plaintiff’s complaint did not expressly charge the defendant Swiss American Bank with knowledge of or participation in the conspiracy complained of. The defendants Tognazzini and the bank having disclaimed any right, title or interest in the lands in controversy, the only issue as against them remaining to be determined was that of the alleged slander of plaintiff’s title. (Walden v. Peters, 2 Rob. (La.) 331, [ 38 Am. Dec. 213 ]; Hewitt v. Seaton, 14 La. 159 .)

“Upon the issue of slander of title there was offered in evidence upon behalf of the plaintiff the deposition of the defendant Tognazzini which in effect was as follows: At the time the deed in controversy was executed the defendant Antonio Fodera was indebted to the Swiss American Bank, of which institution the defendant Tognazzini was manager, in the sum of approximately fourteen thousand dollars. This indebtedness was variously but insufficiently secured. Prior to the execution of the deed Fodera had been pressed for payment and threatened with foreclosure proceedings by the bank. Fodera was unable to meet the demand of the bank, and thereupon, in consideration of the making of the deed in controversy an extension of time was granted him in which to pay his indebtedness. Tognazzini, upon behalf of and as trustee for the bank, accepted the deed as additional security solely upon the representation of Fodera that he had an interest in the property conveyed. Subsequent to the institution of this action Fodera paid his indebtedness to the defendant bank, whereupon Tognazzini executed to Fodera a quitclaim deed to the land in question, and thereupon filed in the action an absolute and unequivocal disclaimer of any right, title or interest in the lands of plaintiff.

“Aside from the mere fact of the execution and acceptance of the deed referred to the plaintiff apparently relied on the testimony of Tognazzini to support the claim that the bank and Tognazzini had conspired with the remaining defendants to slander plaintiff’s title. At any rate the record before us is barren of any other evidence which tends even remotely to connect Tognazzini and the bank with the conception and consummation of the conspiracy alleged and established against the other defendants. The testimony of Tognazzini as detailed in his deposition was not disputed, and in keeping therewith the trial court found ‘That the defendant Antonio Fodera . . . represented to said defendants W. D. Shawhan and T. C. Tognazzini that he, said Fodera, was interested in the property . . . and that the same was held in trust by the said M. K. & T. Oil Co. and D. M. De Long for him, the said Antonio Fodera; that thereupon said Antonio Fodera and wife . . . executed the cleed as additional security for the payment of the indebtedness then due and owing from said Antonio Fodera and Rose Fodera, his wife, to said Swiss American Bank . . . ; that said T. C. Tognazzini . . . relied solely on the uncertain and vague representations of Antonio Fodera without making any investigation as to the truth of the statements of said Antonio Fodera; that at the time of taking said deed said T. C. Tognazzini and the Swiss American Bank had no actual knowledge that plaintiff was the owner of said real property.’

“Standing alone this finding will not support the judgment for damages for slander of title rendered against defendants Tognazzini and Swiss American Bank. The finding of the trial court undoubtedly was sufficient to convict the designated defendants of carelessness in consummating a business transaction involving the title to real property; but neither the finding referred to nor the evidence upon which it was based justifies the conclusion that the deed in controversy was knowingly accepted in furtherance of a conspiracy to slander plaintiff’s title to the property described in the deed. ‘Slander of title,’ as recognized by the law, may be defined to be defamation of title to property, real or personal, by one who falsely and maliciously disparages the title thereto, and thereby causes the owner thereof some special pecuniary loss or damage. (Newhall on Slander of Title, p. 203; Burkett v. Griffith, 90 Cal. 532 , [ 25 Am. St. Rep. 151 , 13 L. R. A. 707, 27 Pac. 527 ].) Admittedly under this definition slander of title may be committed by maliciously clouding the title to real property and causing damage to the owner thereof by the execution, willful acceptance, and malicious recordation of a deed which falsely declares the title of the property involved to be in a person other than the true owner. In short an action for slander of title may be based upon defamatory words contained and published in an executed deed. It is essential, however, to the maintenance of such an action that the party claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged slanderous disparagement of his title should show, among other things, not only that the statements complained of were false, but that they were maliciously made with the intent to defame and thereby disparage the title involved. In other words, malice, express or implied, in the making of slanderous statements is an essential ingredient of a cause of action for damages for slander of title, without proof of which such action must fail. (Chesebro v. Powers, 78 Mich. 472 , [ 44 N. W. 290 ; Harrison v. Howe, 109 Mich. 476 , [ 67 N. W. 527 ]; Walkley v. Bostwick, 49 Mich. 374 , [ 13 N. W. 780 ]; May v. Anderson, 14 Ind. App. 251 , [ 42 N. E. 946 ]; Cardon v, McConnell, 120 N. C. 461 , [ 27 S. E. 109 ]; Hopkins v. Drowne, 21 R. I. 20, [ 41 Atl. 567 ]; Hines v. Lumpkin, 19 Tex. Civ. 556, [ 47 S. W. 818 ]; Malachy v. Soper, 3 Bing. N. C. (Eng.) 371, [132 Eng. Reprint, 453] ; Walden v. Peters, 3 Rob. (La.) 331, [ 38 Am. Dec. 213 ]; Burkett v. Griffith, 90 Cal. 532 , [ 25 Am. St. Rep. 151 , 13 L. R. A. 707, 27 Pac. 527 ]; Newell on Defamation, 206, 207, 322; Townshend on Libel and Slander, 138; 5 Odgers on Libel & Slander, pp. 80, 84; 7 Folkard on Slander & Libel, p. 55.)

“In the present case the plaintiff undoubtedly established his claim of clear title to the lands' in controversy; but aside from this the showing made by him, and the finding of fact above referred to, meet the requirements of the law of the case, in so far as the issue of damages for slander of title was determined against the appealing defendants, in the particulars- only that the slanderous statements uttered and published in the deed relied upon as a cause of action for damages were false and proximately provocative of damage to the plaintiff. It was neither shown in evidence nor found in the finding referred to that the designated defendants were actuated by malicious motives when they accepted and published the deed from the Foderas. It was, as has been shown, essential to the plaintiff’s cause of action for damages that such malice be proved and found; and the burden of proving malice, express or implied, rested upon the plaintiff. True, malice may be fairly implied in any given case from proof of the falsity of an uttered or published defamation when the attendant circumstances convincingly point to the inference that the party charged with the slander of title was not in good faith endeavoring to uphold or assert a supposedly valid claim of title in himself. Such, however, is not the case here. The particular finding of fact referred to is utterly silent as to whether or not the acceptance and recordation of the deed in controversy were prompted by malice, express or implied; and this is so in all likelihood . because the undisputed evidence upon the whole case not only fails to show, either expressly or by fair implication, that malice was the motive which induced the defamation complained of, but, to the contrary, compels the conclusion that the appealing defendants were actuated solely by an honest but mistaken belief that the lands described in the deed in question had been legitimately conveyed to them. This being so, there is no escape from the conclusion that the facts found by the trial court in the finding referred to fall short of constituting a wrong which in contemplation of law will support the judgment rendered against the appealing defendants upon the theory that they had committed an actionable slander of plaintiff’s title. (5 Odgers on Libel & Slander, pp. 80, 84; Butts v. Long, 106 Mo. App. 313 , [ 80 S. W. 312 ]; Walkley v. Bostwick, 49 Mich. 374 , [ 13 N. W. 780 ].)

“Other findings of fact were to the effect: 1. That the defendants Tognazzini and Swiss American Bank had conspired with Fodera to encumber plaintiff’s title, and in pursuance of such conspiracy accepted the deed in controversy and placed the same on record; 2. That said defendants and each of them never had any reason to claim that Fodera had any interest in the plaintiff’s lands; and, 3. That said defendants did not act in good faith in taking the deed from Fodera.

“These findings are absolutely unsupported by any direct evidence; and, as we have already indicated, it cannot be fairly said that the circumstances of the transaction as re vealed by the evidence upon the whole case show or tend to show that the deed in controversy was accepted and recorded by the defendant Tognazzini for any purpose save the one testified to by him. In short, the only direct evidence upon this phase of the case was contained in the deposition of Tognazzini, and that evidence, standing as it does uncontradicted and unimpeached by the admitted facts and circumstances of the transaction, compels, we think, the conclusion that, although not entirely free from fault, the appealing defendants nevertheless, in good faith and without malice, asserted what they honestly believed to be a valid claim of title to plaintiff’s property.”

For the reasons given in the" above opinion the motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The judgment, in so far as it purports to assess damages against the defendants, Tognazzini and the Swiss American Bank, is reversed. The order denying the motion of said defendants for a new trial is affirmed as to all issues relative to the title to the land described in the complaint, and in all other respects is reversed.