The facts upon which this proceeding is based are stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Tyler, Presiding Justice of the district court of appeal, first appellate district, division one. We adopt that opinion in part as follows:

While the Commission granted a full hearing upon the petition filed June 30, 1924, and heard and received evidence upon its merits on behalf of all the parties thereto, it is apparent from the record before us that the order of August 12, 1924, and the order of November 24, 1924, denying a rehearing of the same, were not based upon the evidence adduced at said hearing, but were made upon the belief and finding on the part of the Commission that it had previously decided the issues then before it adversely to the applicant. This is made apparent beyond any question by reference to said orders. The order of August 12, 1924, after certain recitals, contains the following as the sole finding of facts: “The petition for additional relief filed herein on the 30th day of June, 1924, and the evidence introduced in support thereof, involved matters which have been heretofore decided adversely to the applicant, and which, now have become res adjudicada, and this Commission is therefore without jurisdiction to entertain said petition or grant the relief prayed for.” Upon this finding the Commission made its order, as follows: “In accordance with the foregoing Findings, It is hereby ordered that applicant take nothing further by reason of the aforesaid petition or the claim herein asserted.” The order of November 24, 1924, denying a petition for a rehearing, simply recites that: “Good cause appearing therefor, It is ordered that applicant’s petition for rehearing filed herein on the 27th day of September, 1924, be, and the same is hereby, denied.” This was not a hearing upon its merits. When, therefore, the petition on January 6, 192'5, came before said Commission for hearing it examined the record of the proceedings of this matter and determined that the claim of applicant for permanent disability had never been finally adjudicated by said Commission and .that as said application had been made within 245 weeks from the date of the injury the Commission still had jurisdiction of said matter. It thereupon proceeded to hear said application upon its merits and after said hearing and on July 15, 1925, made its supplemental findings and award. As before noted, a petition for a rehearing thereof was denied August 10, 1925. As we view the case as it now stands, there are presented two questions upon the correct answers to which rests the validity of said award of July 15, 1925. The first of these questions is as to the correctness of the finding or conclusion of the Commission that the order before it was not res adjudicata, and the second is as to whether the Commission was bound by its order of August 12, 1924, in which it declared that it had previously adjudicated the claim of applicant for permanent injury.

As to the first of these questions the respondents claim that by two separate orders of the Commission it had decided that applicant had suffered no permanent injury. One of these is the order of date June 20, 1923, and the other was the order of September 7, 1923. In the first place it will be observed from the above recital of the facts herein that the Commission on April 14, 1923, found that the injury “caused temporary partial disability, beginning with the 21st day of November, 1922, continuing indefinitely, entitling the employee to #10.41 per week, based upon a 50 per cent loss of earning power.” An award based upon and in accordance with said finding was made by the Commission. Each party to these proceedings applied for a rehearing, and on June 20, 1923, the Commission denied said applications. Said order was in the following words:

No further action was taken by the Commission under this order and said findings and award of April 14, 1923, were never amended or modified in any manner whatever. Just why the Commission failed to cause amended findings and award to be made and filed does not appear from the record, but it is perfectly clear that as the findings and award of April 14, 1923, were left intact, the order of June 20, 1923, can have but slight, if any, bearing in the determination of the rights of the applicant. We are fully convinced that it was not a final adjudication of applicant’s claim to either temporary or permanent disability. The other order relied upon by said respondents as a final determination by the Commission of applicant’s claim for disability is the order of September 7, 1923. This order was not made by the Commission or by any members thereof, but by a referee of said Commission. Following the signature of the referee to the document were the following words: “Notice: The foregoing order will be approved by the Industrial Commission after 5 days. Notice of approval will be mailed to parties.” This “notice” was unsigned and the record fails to disclose that any further action was taken in pursuance thereof or under said order of the referee. There is an entire absence in the record of any evidence of any order of the Commission approving or confirming the referee’s order of September 7, 1923. By section 4 of the Workmen’s Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act an order made by a referee shall be deemed an order of the Commission .only when approved and confirmed by the Commission. It must be clearly apparent, therefore, that this order of September 7, 1923, was not in any sense a final adjudication of any right of applicant nor was it any order of the Commission whatever. There is, therefore, nothing in the record to support or justify the finding and order of the Commission of date August 12, 1924, holding that “The petition for additional relief filed herein on the 30th day of June, 1924, and the evidence introduced in support thereof, involved matters which have been heretofore decided adversely to the applicant and which now have become res ad judicataAccordingly, it was the duty of the Commission upon the filing of applicant’s petition of June 30, 1924, to proceed and hold a hearing thereon on its merits. This it refused to do for the reason, as set forth in said order of August 12, 1924, that “this Commission is therefore without jurisdiction to entertain said petition or grant the relief prayed for.”

This brings us to our second question and that is the binding effect of this order of August 12, 1924, upon the future acts of 'the Commission. Applicant filed a petition for a rehearing, which was denied. The order thereupon became final. Did this final order of the Commission denying applicant’s petition of June 30, 1924, upon the ground that it was without jurisdiction to entertain the same, preclude it from thereafter entertaining a subsequent petition for the same relief based upon the same state of facts set forth in said prior petition? In other words, is the dismissal of a proceeding for want of jurisdiction to hear the same a bar to a second proceeding of the same character ?

This question has frequently arisen in cases pending before the courts of this state and we see no reason why the same rule prevailing in the courts is not applicable to pro ceedings before the Industrial Accident Commission. In 15 California Jurisprudence, page 129, the rule is stated as follows: “Where a proceeding is dismissed for want of jurisdiction the judgment or order is not a bar or estoppel in another court or proceeding wherein jurisdiction is obtained.” In Slaker v. McCormick-Saeltzer Co., 179 Cal. 387, 389 [ 177 Pac. 155, 156 ], this court, in considering this same question, held as follows:

In the more recent case of Heine Piano Co. v. Bloomer, 183 Cal. 398, 404 [ 191 Pac. 900, 903 ], this court again said: “In Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160 [ 50 Pac. 277 ], it was held that where a suit was dismissed for want of jurisdiction or was disposed of on any ground not going to the merits of the action, the judgment rendered was not a bar to another suit. This rule finds support in 7 Encyclopedia of Evidence, 811; ‘If it appears that a suit has been dismissed" for want of jurisdiction, the judgment of dismissal will be no bar to another action brought in a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter.’ (See, also, Reynolds v. Lincoln, 71 Cal. 183 [ 9 Pac. 176 , 12 Pac. 449 ]; 23 Cyc. 1150; Laguna Drainage District v. Charles Martin Co., 5 Cal. App. 166, 172 [ 89 Pac. 933 ]; Shively v. Eureka Tellurium etc. Co., 5 Cal. App. 236, 243 [ 89 Pac. 1073 ].) As already shown, the order of April 3d stated that the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the satisfaction of judgment was denied by reason of want of jurisdiction. Inasmuch as this order—and not the order of April 5th—represented the court’s ruling on the motion to vacate, we think it clear that the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to have the satisfaction of judgment in action 76,831 vacated is not res judicata.”

Prom these authorities it would appear that the order of August 12, 1924, dismissing applicant’s petition upon the ground that the Commission had no jurisdiction, was not a bar to the proceeding instituted by applicant on January 6, 1925. The Commission, therefore, was authorized to hear said petition upon its merits. By this petition applicant sought an award for permanent disability. In effect he claimed in this petition that he was then suffering from a permanent disability as a result of the injury received by him on June 27, 1922. The only final order made by the Commission relative to his right to receive compensation for this injury was the order of April 14, 1923, awarding him compensation for temporary injury to continue until terminated. We have already seen that no legal order of the Commission had ever been made terminating this compensation. Applicant was therefore authorized to show under his last petition any change in his condition subsequent to April 14, 1923, and if the evidence introduced upon the hearing of said petition showed that his disability from said injury had since said last-named date become permanent, he was entitled to an award accordingly. The Commission found from the evidence produced at said hearing that he was then suffering a permanent disability as a result of said injury and made the award which peti tioners seek to set aside by these proceedings. It is not seriously contended that the evidence before the Commission was not sufficient to support the findings upon which said award was based if the Commission was authorized to receive evidence of applicant’s condition prior to the several orders which we have considered above. In other words, if the Commission was authorized to disregard the orders of June 20th and September 7, 1923, and August 12, 1924, and receive evidence, as it did, regarding applicant’s condition at all times since the date of its order of April 14,1923', then respondents, as we understand their position, do not seriously contend that such evidence was insufficient to sustain the findings and award of July 15, 1925. As we have already shown, the Commission was within its legal rights in disregarding these three orders. In our opinion the evidence, irrespective of any contention which might be made to the contrary, was sufficient to sustain said findings and award.

In the course of these proceedings the respondents have contended that the petition of January 6, 1925, was not one for permanent disability, but was for back compensation on a partial disability basis claimed to be due applicant under a prior order of the Commission and for a surgical operation. It is true, that said petition asks for such compensation and for such an operation. It further sets forth that applicant is still disabled and unable to work and asks that the Commission enter its findings and awards “finding petitioner’s rights based upon his present condition.” The petition was filed over three years after the date of the receipt of the injury. It might be assumed that any disability from which the applicant was then suffering as a result of said injury was permanent or, at least, that applicant claimed it to be permanent. The petition of January 6, 1925, appears to have been considered by the Commission, at least, as one for permanent disability compensation. The hearing thereon was conducted with a view of ascertaining the condition of applicant at the date of the filing of said petition, the only purpose of which was to fix the compensation to which applicant was entitled, based upon the condition in which he might then be found. Under these circumstances we are not prepared to hold that the petition was insufficient as a petition for permanent disability. For the reasons hereinbefore stated, the petition to review said amended findings and award of July 15, 1925, is denied and said award is hereby affirmed.

Langdon, J., Waste, C. J., Shenk, J., Richards, J., Sea-well, J., and Preston, J., concurred.