Brill

This appeal involves alone the question of the propriety under section 26a of the Street Opening Act of 1903 (Deering’s Gen. Laws, Act 8198, p. 3309), of an order directing a reassessment in a proceeding involving the opening, widening and extending of Flower Street from Washington Street to Exposition Boulevard, and the laying out of a new street in prolongation of said Flower Street from Exposition Boulevard, to the intersection of Thirty-eighth and Figueroa Streets in Los Angeles.

This section purports to contain its own measure of power. Power to reassess applies to a case where omission, irregularity, illegality, informality, or noncompliance with the requirements of the statutes is present. It does not exist where “the issuing of such (original) assessment was entirely without the power of the city to issue.” In other words, where due process of law is present when the first assessment is made, the reassessment is proper; where it is absent, the reassessment is improper. Said section 26a is closely akin to section 12*4 of the Vrooman Act (Stats. 1885, p. 147, Stats. 1913, p. 409), the provisions of which have been held valid and curative under circumstances similar to those…

I dissent. The court found on the undisputed record of the proceedings to open, widen and extend Flower Street, that the improvement proposed contemplated the opening of a new street to be known as Flower Street, but separate and distinct from and approximately parallel to the existing Flower Street for a distance of approximately 900 feet south of Exposition Boulevard. I am unable to distinguish this situation from that presented in O. T. Johnson Gorp. v. City of Los Angeles, 198 Cal. 308 [ 245 Pac. 164 ], wherein it was held that under similar circumstances the city council was without jurisdiction to proceed because of the want of due process. In such case any assessment thereafter made would be void. I am in agreement with the premise laid down in the main opinion that jurisdiction does not exist where the issuing of the original assessment was entirely without the power of the city and that "when due process of law is present when the first assessment is made, the reassessment is proper; when it is absent, the reassessment is improper.” If the original assessment would have been invalid for want of jurisdiction it would necessarily follow from the above premise that the…