Pleading—Construction of Complaint on Appeal—Support of Judgment for Plaintiff.—In the absence of a demurrer to the complaint, its averments must be construed on appeal with great liberality, so far as may be necessary in support of the judgment for the plaintiff.

Id.—Action for Damages Alone—Showing of Damages Essential. In an action to recover damages alone, a judgment for the plaintiff is not supported either by the complaint or by the findings, if the complaint contains no express allegation of damages, nor any statement of facts showing substantial damages, and the findings are in the language of the complaint on the subject.

Id.—Measure of Damages for Fraudulent Exchange—Difference in Values at Time of Exchange.—In the absence of any claim of special damages, the measure of damages for fraudulently inducing the plaintiff to exchange certain mortgages for bonds, is the excess of the value of the mortgages over the value of the bonds, such values being taken as of the time of the exchange. This rule applies, at least, in all cases where there are no supervening circumstances which render the values at some other time material to the injury arising from the fraud.

Id.—Values at Time of Commencement of Action—Insufficient Finding.—A finding that at the time of the commencement of the action to recover damages for inducing such fraudulent exchange, which was more than two years after the exchange was made, the bonds received by the plaintiff, and the property securing the same, were of no value, is insufficient to establish the fact that the bonds were not worth more than the mortgages when they were exchanged.

Id.—Exchange of Mortgages Constituting First Liens for Bonds— Inference as to Value—Judgment for Mortgage Indebtedness Unauthorized.—The mere fact that the mortgages given by the plaintiff in exchange for the bonds had constituted a first lien on the property securing the bonds, and that the bonds received by him were not an exclusive first lien thereon, although it might warrant the inference that the bonds received were of less value than the mortgages, is insufficient to show the difference in their respective values, or to indicate that it was substantial. While such fact might authorize the recovery by the plaintiff of nominal damages, it would not support a judgment for the whole amount of the mortgage indebtedness.

Id.—Rescission—Offer must be Prompt upon Discovert of Facts.— A person having a right to rescind must make the offer promptly, upon discovering the facts which entitle him to rescind, if he is free from duress, menace, undue influence, or disability, and is aware of his right to rescind.

Id.—Ignorance of Facts Justifying Rescission—Laches—Notice of Facts Putting on Inquiry—Change in Conditions.—The plaintiff’s ignorance of the falsity of the representations inducing him to make the exchange, would, as a general rule, negative any loches on his part in offering to rescind. This rule is subject to the principle that notice of facts and circumstances which would put a man of ordinary prudence and intelligence on inquiry is, in the eye of the law, equivalent to knowledge of all the facts a reasonably diligent inquiry would disclose. The promptness necessary to escape the estoppel of loches will depend on the circumstances of the case. In general, the right is lost if, during the delay, conditions have changed so that a rescission tvill cause to the other party material loss which he would not have suffered if it had been demanded sooner.

Id.—Eight of Bescission Lost by Delay.—In accordance with the foregoing rules, it is held, upon a review of the evidence, that the plaintiff had lost his right of rescission of the contract of exchange by his delay in ascertaining his condition after having been put on inquiry respecting the nature of the bonds received by him, and the extent to which they were a first lien on the property, and by his delay in asserting his rights thereafter.