A hearing was granted in this case after decision by the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two. We hereby adopt the following statement of facts and review of the evidence by Mr. Justice pro tem. Archbald as part of the opinion of this court:

The foregoing review of the pleadings and testimony demonstrates that the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence, and that the judgment should be sustained unless serious error is shown. Defendants strenuously contend that prejudicial error was committed by the trial court in the reception of certain testimony, and that this alleged error is ground for reversal of the judgment.

The testimony referred to is that of Miss LePelletier, Miss Seevers and Miss Seger, each of whom testified over objection that plaintiff introduced them to defendant Harley Moore on “a business transaction”. It appears that defendants did not sell these witnesses any property, and that in fact they were principally interested, at the time, in selling their own property, rather than in purchasing property through defendants. Defendants make the point that the fact that these three women listed their properties for sale could not be probative on the issue of an agreement to divide commissions on property purchased.

Preliminarily, we deem it proper to state that in a record such as that before us, with substantial evidence to support the plaintiff’s claim, it is not easy to characterize this evidence as seriously prejudicial, even if improper. The contention is that it was irrelevant, but while collateral matters not connected with the issues should be excluded, prejudicial error from their admission should reasonably appear, and we doubt whether the confusion of the jury in this case was as great as appellants maintain.

But in fact the evidence was admissible. Plaintiff testified to an oral agreement by which he was to introduce defendants to wealthy “clients” and “prospects”, and defendants were to do the work of selling, and divide commissions with plaintiff. Plaintiff’s duty was solely to make the contacts or introductions. Plaintiff was permitted to testify without objection that on the occasion of arriving at this agreement, they discussed the names of several prospects, that is, the details of plaintiff’s anticipated performance, and at this conversation plaintiff and defendant discussed the names of the Barnes family, Miss Seger, Miss Seevers and Miss LePelletier. Any evidence showing that plaintiff brought these very people in contact with defendants tends to corroborate the fact of the agreement itself, which was in dispute. The rule that acts of the parties subsequent to an agreement may be competent evidence of its terms is well settled. (Tennant v. Wilde, 98 Cal. App. 437 [ 277 Pac. 137 ].) See, also, as to the admissibility of the testimony in question, Moody v. Peirano, 4 Cal. App. 411 [ 88 Pac. 380 ]; Lobree v. White Lumber Co., 53 Cal. App. 85 [ 199 Pac. 821 ].

Moreover, it appears from the testimony of one of these witnesses, Miss Seger, that she was a future prospect. On cross-examination by counsel for defendants, as to whether there was any understanding between herself and plaintiff that upon sale of her property she might buy, she testified: “I said I might be interested . . . but would not be further interested until I would dispose of the Beverly Hills house.”

Finally, it appears that the very evidence objected to— the fact that these three women were introduced by plaintiff to defendant and were interested in selling their property—was also given by defendant Harley Moore, who, under examination of his own counsel, recited the same matters, that is, that plaintiff introduced him to these women and that they listed property with defendants for sale.

The record shows, therefore, that the introduction to these three women was part of the agreement as related in plaintiff’s testimony; that their names and the facts concerning the transactions had with them were given in evidence both by plaintiff and defendants, without objection; and that one of them was interested in purchasing property in the future. It seems to us that their testimony tended to corroborate the essential fact of the agreement, and though subject to different inferences, was admissible. In any event, the jury, having before them their names and the very facts to which they testified, could not have been prejudiced by their direct testimony.

We find no reversible error. The judgment is affirmed.