Before the court of appeal, which had original jurisdiction of this case, the following decision was rendered by Hart, J.:

A hearing was granted by this court, principally because of the very urgent insistence of the respondent that the decision of the court of appeal was revolutionary and declared as an inflexible rule of law that the driver of a motor vehicle approaching a steam railroad crossing was negligent if, his vision being obstructed, he did not stop his vehicle, leave it, and go forward for purposes of observation. Such, of course, is not the adopted rule of law in this state, but a fair reading of the opinion of the court of appeal will disclose that it does not lay down this proposition as being the law. Its discussion is addressed to a motion for a nonsuit under the particular facts of the case before it, and it is held that the motion should have been granted because of the manifest contributory negligence of the driver of the motor vehicle in doing what he did. It is unnecessary in detail to recapitulate the facts as above set forth. But in brief the driver was approaching a crossing which he knew and declared to be an especially dangerous one. He was approaching the crossing upon the left-hand side of the roadway, on which side a building obstructed his view of the railroad track on his left hand. He would have had a larger and freer view had he been driving on the right side of the road. When he passed beyond the projection of the building so that he could see down the track, the space, by his own testimony, was so narrow that he had already put himself in a position of danger. Yet he did so drive, on the left side, without even stopping, and he did so place himself that the injury to the automobile was inevitable. It is in dealing with these facts that the language of the court of appeal is to be read, and, so read, that language is sound in law.

The opinion and judgment of the court of appeal is adopted, and for the reasons therein given the judgment is reversed.