Bledsoe

I dissent. If the dismissal of this proceeding was based upon the ground that the affirmance of the judgment in the ease of People v. Campbell, ante, p. 11, puts the right of petitioner to receive his salary during the pendency of that appeal into the category of moot questions, I should have nothing to say. Since it is agreed on all sides that a final judgment confirming petitioner’s title to the office will enable him to collect his back salary in full as soon as he could collect it by means of a peremptory writ issued in this case, it is of no practical consequence to these parties how the question originally involved may be decided. But since the court has undertaken to construe the law, and so to make a precedent for future cases, I desire to indicate very briefly the reasons why, in my opinion, that construction is unwarranted.

The right of the public officers of this state to receive their salaries at stated periods is not derived from section 936 of the Political Code. By various provisions of the general laws of the state the amount and mode and manner of payment of all salaries are fixed and established. In the case of the judges of the superior court, the payment of…

This is an original proceeding for mandate brought against the state controller, asking that he be ordered to draw his warrant in favor of Benjamin P. Bledsoe for salary as judge of the superior court in and for the county of San Bernardino. The facts are these:—

Under the foregoing state of facts is petitioner, Bledsoe, entitled to his salary pending the' appeal? The solution of this question is dependent alone upon the construction to be given section 936 of the Political Code, which section is .as follows: “When the title of the incumbent of any office in this state is contested by proceedings instituted in any court for that purpose, no warrant can thereafter be drawn or paid for any part of his salary until such proceedings have been finally determined; provided, hoivever, that this section shall not be construed to apply to any party to a contest or proceeding now pending or hereafter instituted who holds the certificate of election or commission of office and discharges the duties of the office; and such party shall receive the salary of such office the same as if no such contest or proceeding was pending.” For many years this section stood upon the statute-books as…