Negligence — Bailroad — Bule as to “Flying Switch” — Fellow-Employee.—A rule of a railroad company for the government of its employees, which provided that running or flying switches must not be made except where it would cause great delay to do the work in any other manner, and that “whenever they are made the train must first be stopped and before the engine is again started the switch and also the brakes on the car to be set out must be tested and great care used,” in no degree adds to the liability of the company so as to make it liable to an employee for the negligence of a fellow-employee who was a member of the train crew making the flying switch, and who violated its provisions. Such rule simply relates to the manner in which the switching crew should perform the* work of switching, and did not make those engaged merely in that work the agents of the company for the inspection and discovery of defects in the cars, for whose negligence it would be responsible to other employees; and a negligent failure on the part of one of the switching crew to comply with the rule is, as respects other employees, only the negligence of the employee, and not that of the company.

Id.—Injury to Oar-Bepairer—Instructions.—In an action by a ear-repairer of the railroad company, who was injured as the result of a “flying switch,” made with a car having a defective brake, instructions which in effect left the question as to whether the company had been negligent in the matter of the inspection of the brakes to turn upon the violation of such rule by a member of the .switching crew are erroneous, and necessitate a reversal of a judgment for the plaintiff. This result follows, although other instructions charged the jury directly to the contrary, and in terms too favorable to the defendant.

Id.—Negligent Inspection of Cab—Evidence.—In such an action, although there may have been sufficient evidence to have warranted the jury in finding that the company had been negligent in the-matter of inspecting the defective car, if such negligence is not shown as matter of law, this court cannot say, in the face of such instructions, that the jury so found, in order to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff.

Id.—Duty to Inspect Cabs—Reasonable Cabe—Defective Brake.—It . is a primary and non-assignable duty of a railroad company to its-employees to use reasonable care to discover and remedy any defect-in a ear as a completed appliance, and it is responsible to any employee injured by reason of its failure so to do, except to an employee whose duty it is to discover the defect, and whose negligent failure to do so contributes to Ms own injury. This requirement includes any defect in the adjustment of the brakes which renders-them wholly ineffectual, however arising, just as fully as any other defeet. The company cannot escape responsibility in this matter by any delegation of the duty.

Id.—Reasonableness of Cabe fob Jury.—In an action by a ear-repairer of a railroad company, who while working under a stationary car was injured by another ear while making a “flying switch," and which was not subject to control by reason of a defective brake, the question of the company’s negligence depends upon its failure to use reasonable care,—that is, such care as was under all the circumstances reasonably consistent with a due regard for the safety of its employees,—in inspecting the switched ear for the discovery and remedying of such defects as would render that car an unsafe appliance. In the determination of the question of fact as to-whether reasonable care was used in the matter of inspection, it is proper to take into consideration with other circumstances the fact that the ear was not then being used for transportation purposes, " but was being temporarily kept for unloading in the railroad yard, and also that there was a rule prohibiting the company’s employees from making a flying switch without first testing its brakes. In the present ease the question of the proximate cause of the accident and the reasonableness of the care exercised by the defendant was one of fact for the jury,