The appeal herein was taken to the district court of appeal of the third appellate district, it being a proceeding in eminent domain. A decision was there rendered upon an opinion by Mr. Justice Hart of that court, affirming the judgment of the superior court. Upon application of the appellant to this court the decision of the district court was vacated and the cause transferred to this court for rehearing. Upon further consideration we are satisfied with the conclusion of the district court that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed. The determination that no cause of forfeiture existed makes it unnecessary, in our opinion, to decide whether or not the statutory forfeiture declared m section 468 of the Civil Code is self-executing. The following passages from the opinion of Justice Hart clearly state the case and the main reasons showing that no cause of forfeiture existed:

Some additional points remain to be noticed. The articles of consolidation and incorporation, constituting the plaintiff’s charter, designate some of the numerous roads comprising its railroad system as “a branch,” and others as “a line of railroad,” and still others as “a branch” from some one of these “lines.” The line extending from Albion to Healdsburg, over the defendant’s land sought to be condemned, is designated in said articles as “ a line of railroad,’’ and is described in the same manner in the complaint. From this the plaintiff argues that it is not a branch line but a road entirely independent of the main trunk line from Eureka to San Francisco, with which it is to connect at Healdsburg. We do not think these words were intended to have such significance. The articles of incorporation must control upon this point, and they should be considered as an entirety. So considered, it is plain that the line from Eureka, in Humboldt County, to San Francisco, is what is usually designated the main trunk line of the company, and that the other lines, whether denominated “a line of railroad” or “a branch,” are in truth mere parts of the general railroad system which the company proposes to complete, maintain, and operate as a whole. The terms “line of railroad” and “branch” are simply convenient terms of description. The former was not used to convey the idea that the lines to which it is applied were to be, or were, in any sense, independent of the trunk line and general system described. Section 473 of the Civil Code, as amended in 1901, [Stats. 1901, p. 327], requires the articles of a consolidated railroad corporation, such as the plaintiff is, to state, “the termini of its road and branches,” and “the estimated length of its road and branches.” In the original section, as enacted in 1872, the part of section 468 here applicable was in the same language as it is now, but section 473 did not then prescribe the form of articles of incorporation, leaving that matter to he controlled by section 291, which then required, and now requires, articles of incorporation of a railroad company to state “the place from and to which it is intended to be run and all the intermediate branches.” It seems dear that the term “road,” as used in section 468, was intended to include the main line and all branches of the company, and that this applied both to original companies and to consolidated companies. We find nothing in the terms of the amendment of 1901 to section 473 indicating an intent to change the law in this respect. Statutes declaring a forfeiture are not to be extended beyond their direct meaning by implication, unless such implication is imperatively necessary by reason of the subject matter or terms of the statute. We find nothing requiring such extension in the statute under consideration. The system described in the articles of incorporation of the plaintiff must he deemed to be the “road” of which, by section 468, five miles must be constructed each year in order to escape the forfeiture therein declared.

The appellant also sets up as a defense by way of -abatement that the plaintiff, at the time the action was begun, had not filed in the office of the county clerk any map and profile of the part of the road within the county, “and of the land ac quired for the use thereof,” as required by section 466 of the Civil Code, ‘and this the court found to be true. This filing, it is claimed, is by that section made a condition precedent to the existence of a right in the company to acquire land in that county by proceedings in condemnation. The section provides that such map and profile must be so filed “within a reasonable time after its road is finally located.” There is nothing indicating that the right to resort to eminent domain to acquire land for the use of the road was to be dependent on the previous filing of such map and profile. The requirement that the map and profile must include “the land acquired for the use thereof” rather implies the contrary. Other reasons lead to the same conclusion. No condition of that character is stated in. section 1001 of the Civil Code giving .the right of eminent domain to any “person” (which includes a corporation), seeking to acquire property for .any of the uses specified in section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 1238 specifies railroads as one of the public uses for which property may he taken, and it prescribes no such condition .as is here contended for. There is nowhere in the statute relating to this subject any express statement of such condition, or any language from which such condition earn be fairly implied. In such a ease the court cannot reasonably supply the condition by construction. There is nothing in the statute to show that the provision of section 466 of the Civil Code requiring the filing of such map and profile has any relation to the maintenance of an action to condemn property.

This embraces all the questions presented in the case.

The judgment is affirmed.

Sloss, J., Angellotti, J., Lorigan, J., Melvin, J., and Henshaw, J. concurred.