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I concur in the foregoing conclusions but not in much of the reasoning which supports it. By the terms of the San Francisco charter prior to the amendment of section 14 of chapter 11, article XI thereof, adopted by the people in 1922 and approved by the legislature in 1923, the use of voting machines in municipal elections was permitted and might have been provided for by whatever municipal body had been invested by the charter with control over “all matters pertaining to elections.’’ The board of election commissioners was that body according to the express terms of section 1, chapter 1, article XI of the charter, and it seems t.o me beyond question that if the election commissioners, prior to said charter amendment of 1922, could have found a model of voting machine which would have provided for preferential voting, or, in other words, had been so constructed that “the ballot shall be arranged on the machine in the same form in each assembly district as provided for the printed ballot” the election commissioners would have had power to install such voting machines, and their act in so doing would have been merely an administrative act. It was probably the fact that such voting…

I concur in the conclusion reached by the Chief Justice in the majority opinion. There are two matters which I desire, so far as I am concerned, shall be left open for decision in the future should occasion arise.

First: My present view is that the powers conferred on the board of election commissioners by article XI, chapter 1, section 1 of the charter are but administrative in character and not legislative. I am of the opinion that the purpose and effect of article II, chapter 1, section 1 of the charter was to vest the legislative power of the city and county of San Francisco in the board of supervisors. If there is a necessary and irreconcilable conflict between the two sections the provisions relating to the power of the board of election commissioners must prevail under the rule respecting conflicts between general and special provisions. In determining whether or not there is such conflict we should construe each of the provisions, if they are reasonably susceptible of such construction, so as to maintain the integrity of each of them. This may be done, I believe, by giving full effect to article II, chapter 1, section 1, vesting the legislative power of the city and…

The petitioner, a taxpayer of the city and county of San Francisco, prays for a writ of mandate directed to the respondent, who is the registrar of voters of the city and county of San Francisco, requiring the respondent .to print the ballots for the coming municipal election to be held in November, in accordance with the charter provisions of the charter of the city and county of San Francisco (art. XI, c. 2, sec. 19 of the charter of the city and county of San Francisco). He alleges that the board of election commissioners and the respondent have determined to conduct the election in accordance with the general laws of the state of California, purporting to act under and in pursuance of section 14 of chapter 2, article XI, of the charter of the city and county of San Francisco, amended by the people of San Francisco in 1922 and approved by the legislature in 1923. This section of the charter as thus amended reads as follows: “In the event of the use of voting machines the arrangement of the ballot, the counting of the vote, the canvass of returns and the determination of the result shall be governed by the general laws of the state.”

It is alleged that the board of election…