People v. Lee Nam Chin

Appellant was convicted in the superior court of San Joaquin County of murder, sentenced to death, and from the. judgment and the order denying him a new trial appeals.

The deceased, Kim Yuen, and defendant, both Coreans, were employed on a potato ranch in San Joaquin County, managed by a Chinaman, and some serious difficulty, inaugurated by defendant, occurring between them, the manager discharged the deiendant. The next day—September 26, 1912—about noon, deceased and a number of Chinamen started in a wagon from the ranch to go to Walnut Grove, and the defendant accompanied them. After they had proceeded a short distance defendant left the wagon, claiming he had a headache which the riding aggravated, and that he would walk into town, a distance of about four miles. The others left him on the road and proceeded to Walnut Grove, from whence, about three o’clock, they started to return in the wagon to the ranch. While proceeding homeward two shots, one of which killed the deceased, were fired from a clump of bushes at the side of the road some seven or eight feet from the wagon, on the bed of which deceased was seated. Two of the Chinamen who were riding in the wagon with the…

I concur in the judgment. I do not assent to the doctrine that evidence of flight cannot be considered unless there be a showing that the defend ant knew, when he fled, that he was charged with the crime. Immediate flight, in the absence of any accusation—in advance, perhaps, of the possibility of an accusation, formal or informal—may afford very persuasive evidence of a consciousness of guilt. (Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 276.)

With regard to the other qualification referred to in the foregoing opinion, it is no doubt true that a mere departure from the vicinity of the alleged crime would have no logical tendency to prove guilt if the defendant, at the time of taking his departure, did not know that a crime had been committed. It would seem proper, therefore, to qualify the charge, if one is to be given at all, by telling the jury that flight is to be considered only where there is other evidence showing such knowledge on the part of the defendant. Bnt this is almost necessarily implied in an instruction which tells the jury that evidence of flight is received only as “indicative of a guilty mind” and as “tending to prove a consciousness of guilt.” It is hardly to be supposed that…