The case was decided upon appeal hy the district court of the third appellate district and was transferred to this court for the purpose of a further consideration of two of the points involved.

The first of these questions was whether or not P. H. Murphy and E. W. Murphy could maintain an action under the designation of P. H. Murphy & Son without filing the eertifi cate contemplated by sections 2466 and 2468 of the Civil Code. If this were a question unaffected by Californian precedent, we might perhaps hold that the partnership had the right and capacity to sue, but in view of the decisions of this court, and particularly the opinion in the ease of North v. Moore, 135 Cal. 621 , [ 67 Pac. 1037 ] (decided in 1902), in which it was held that “Abrams Bros.” was not a designation showing the names of persons interested as partners, we are satisfied that the opinion of the district court of appeal written by Mr. Presiding Justice Chipman correctly states the law. Supplementing his comments upon Axe v. Tolbert, 179 Mich. 556 -566, [ 146 N. W. 418 ], we may say that the statement of the court in that case is not entirely supported by the citations made. The first of these, Castle Bros. v. Graham, 87 App. Div. 97 , [ 84 N. Y. Supp. 120 ], 180 N. Y. 553 , [ 73 N. E. 1120 ], is in absolute conflict with North v. Moore , and is therefore not authoritative in California. The two Californian eases cited by the Michigan supreme court (Pendleton v. Cline, 85 Cal. 142 , [ 24 Pac. 659 ], and Carlock v. Cagnacci, 88 Cal. 600 , [ 26 Pac. 597 ]), involve partnerships in which suit was brought in each instance by partners using their names but not their initials. Bovee v. De Jong, 22 S. D. 163, [ 116 N. W. 83 ], was exactly like the two cases last discussed and was decided upon their authority. Guiterman v. Wishon, 21 Mont. 458 , [ 54 Pac. 566 ], was a case in which “Guiterman Bros.” was held a sufficient designation of the names of the partners. This also is of no value as authority in this state, owing to the later decision of North v. Moore, 135 Cal. 621 , [ 67 Pac. 1037 ]. Patterson v. Byers, 17 Okl. 633 , [10 Ann. Cas. 810, 89 Pac. 1114 ], the last case cited by the supreme court of Michigan in the Axe case, announces the remarkable conclusion that “Patterson Furniture Company” shows that there is a company composed of persons whose surname is Patterson; and that “it further shows that there are no other members of the firm except those whose surname is Patterson.” Evidently the learned justice who wrote that opinion overlooked the fact that commonly the title “Patterson Furniture Company” might indicate a corporation or copartnership in which the stockholders or members might or might not be Pattersons. It will thus be seen that neither by its reasoning nor its cited authority is Axe v. Tolbert, 179 Mich. 556 -566, [ 146 N. W. 418 ], of convincing weight.

Upon the appeals of P. H. Murphy & Son and of William A. Pagan we adopt the opinion of the learned district court of appeal as follows:

POPE & TALBOT CLAIM.

Regarding the claim of Pope & Talbot a new question arises, but it is one in the solution of which we are aided by a decision of this court given since this matter was discussed by the district court of appeal. The essential facts and the question to be decided are well set forth by the district court of appeal, and we adopt that part of the opinion as follows:

It is true that, as Mr. Phillips says in his work on Mechanics’ Liens: “Where the law allows ninety days for filing a lien, and ninety days after filing in which to bring suit, and a good lien is filed, the second ninety days begins to run, and the time cannot be extended by amending or filing a new lien, though within the original ninety days.” (Phillips on Mechanics’ Liens, sec. 323.) The text is supported by Battle v. McArthur, 49 Fed. 715 , and Mulloy v. Lawrence, 31 Mo. 583 , is also to the same effect. In both of these cases the courts were construing a statute of the state of Missouri which gives to a contractor a lien which must be filed within ninety days next after the completion of the work. It was properly held that the filing of one lien under the Missouri statute set in motion the statute of limitations, and that unless suit was brought within ninety days thereafter the lien ceased to exist by the express provisions of the law. But in California we have a very different statute, which must be carefully examined in connection with the facts, here presented. That is section 1187 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, in part, is as follows:

In the recent case of Hughes Mfg. etc. Co. v. Hathaway, 174 Cal. 44 , [ 161 Pac. 1159 ], in which a petition for rehearing was denied on January 15, 1917, the court decided, after a review of said section 1187 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that a claim filed within thirty days after formal notice of completion by the owner (and, of course, the same rule would apply where notice of cessation from work was given) might be foreclosed as if filed within thirty days after the actual completion of the building (and, of course, the same principle is applicable in a case where the contractor had ceased to perform work and the statutory notice had been given). There were not successive liens filed in that case, as here, one prior and one subsequent to the owner’s notice of completion, but the purpose and spirit of the statute were reviewed by Mr. Justice Shaw, in part, as follows:

The statute gives several starting points for the filing of the mechanic’s or materialman’s notice of lien, any one of which may be equivalent to “a completion”—not the completion— of the building. Unless the period is lessened by the owner’s act in giving the formal notice, provided by the statute, of completion or cessation from the work, he is estopped to deny its timeliness if it be filed within ninety days of completion or abandonment. If Pope & Talbot had chosen to refrain from filing any claim at all until after the owner’s act of giving notice of cessation from work, undoubtedly the claim of December 27th would have been entirely available and the owner might not complain. How, then, is he injured by the abandonment of the original claim and the filing of a new one timed by his own act which by the statute is made ‘ ‘ equivalent to a completion”? We can discover nothing operating to his detriment. The first claim of lien was not available against him at the time of the suit because of the limitation of section 1190 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but even if it had been, no court would permit two recoveries for the same items. Under the statute a lien claimant may select any one of several times as “equivalent to a completion.” It is our opinion that these periods are not each exclusive of all of the others or that action by the lien claimant measured from one period forecloses him from all resort to the other rights to which he may be entitled under section 1187. Nor do we conclude that because he has filed his claim within thirty days of actual completion or abandonment of work on the building, he has inexorably set in motion the limiting restraint of section 1190 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against all of his rights. Rather do we regard each of those times and circumstances “equivalent to a completion” as setting in motion a new period for the filing of a claim, and that the limitation expressed in section 1190 applies to each of such claims as such and not to all rights which the claimant may possibly enjoy under any one of them.

The judgment is affirmed as to all appellants except Pope & Talbot. As to that corporation, plaintiff and appellant, it is reversed.

Shaw, J., Henshaw, J., and Lorigan, J., concurred.