Beveridge

The plaintiff, a natural person, commenced this action to condemn a strip of land through premises owned by defendant for a right of way for a railroad. It is averred in the complaint that the board of supervisors of Los Angeles County had granted to plaintiff a franchise to construct and maintain an electric railway in the county of Los Angeles, over and along a route shown upon a map annexed to the complaint. The line described nearly bisects the land of defendant, which is a rectangular tract containing one hundred and twenty acres. The strip sought to be condemned for the right of way is thirty-five feet wide.

The matter was submitted to a jury, which, framing its verdict according to the statute, found that the land to be taken was of the value of $429 on the twenty-fifth day of November, 1899, when the proceeding was commenced; that the land not taken would be damaged to the extent of $2,000, and that such land would be benefited by the construction of' the proposed road to the extent of $500; that fencing the right of way would cost $233.64.

A motion for a new trial was denied, and from such order and from the judgment this appeal is taken.

There are many assignments of…

The plaintiff, a natural person, having obtained a franchise to construct and operate a certain railroad, commenced this action to condemn a right of way for a part of its line of railway through the land of defendant. In the trial court plaintiff had judgment, from which and from an order denying her motion for a new trial defendant appeals.

The main question in the case relates to the amount of compensation which the appellant was entitled to for the value of the land taken and damages for land not taken. The jury found the value of the land taken to be $429; damages to the land not taken, $2,000; and for costs of fences and cattle-guards, $233.84. It also found that the benefit from the construction of the railroad to the land not taken was $500. Upon this basis the court fixed the amount to be paid appellant at $1,929, which appellant contends was too small.

There are one or two minor matters to be disposed of. Appellant contends that the court erred in not sustaining her challenge to the juror Newell. On this point it is sufficient to say that after considering all the testimony of the juror we cannot say that the court erred in holding that he had not such an unqualified…

I dissent, and think that the judgment should be affirmed. I adhere to the opinion delivered and the conclusion arrived at in Department. I desire to add only that, in my judgment, the intent of section 14 of article I of our state constitution to discriminate against corporations other than municipal, and against them alone, is so obvious as to leave no room for doubt on the subject. Clearly a constitutional provision must be construed in the light of the law as it stood when the provision was adopted. Now, at the time of the adoption of the provision in question the established law of this state was, that in all cases of the exercise of the power of eminent domain— irrespective of the character of the persons seeking to exercise it—the owner of the land taken was entitled to only “just compensation”; and that, in determining what was just compensation, as was said in San Francisco etc. R. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 31 Cal. 368 , the weight of authority is in favor of "allowing benefits and advantages to be considered in estimating what is a just compensation to be awarded in such cases, and it seems to us that the reasons in support of this view of the subject are unanswerable.” (See,…