At the close of the argument, Sloss, J., delivered the opinion of the court, Shaw, J., and Lawlor, J., concurring.

This cause comes here on an order for a rehearing after decision by the district court of appeal for the second appellate district. That court filed an opinion which states the essential facts, and makes satisfactory disposition of most of the legal questions presented.

From that opinion we quote:

We adopt the foregoing portions of the opinion of the district court of appeal as our opinion on the points thus discussed. Our views on the remaining questions are as follows:

The defendant Furniture Company contends that its contract of guaranty did not extend beyond the sum of one thousand dollars agreed to be paid by the principal as rent under the lease; and that since the evidence shows payment by the lessee of more than one thousand dollars of such rental it follows that the guaranty is fully satisfied.

This contention cannot, we think, be sustained. The lease covered a term of ten years, and contemplated monthly payments during that period. The purpose of the guaranty was to provide the lessor with security for these successive payments of rent. The total rental aggregated over forty thous- and dollars, and the words, “up to the amount of $1,000” were designed to fix a limit to the guarantor’s total liability. The guarantor was not binding itself beyond one thousand dollars, but up to that point it guaranteed “the payment of the rent in said lease specified.” The rent guaranteed was the rent for the entire period, not merely for the first three months. This, we think, would be the fair construction of the instrument, if the words just quoted stood alone. The correctness of the interpretation is the more apparent upon a consideration of the further provision that the guaranty is to hold good until the furniture is fully paid for and a chattel mortgage thereof delivered to the lessor. It is perfectly plain from the record that the parties did not contemplate that the furniture would be fully paid for and the mortgage executed before the lapse of many months. Until this was done the lessor was to have the guaranty as security. It certainly was not intended that, if the tenant paid rent for the first three months, the lessor should be without any security, whether by way of mortgage or of guaranty, for the balance of the term. The fair meaning of the instrument, taken as a whole, is that the lessor is to have the security of the one thousand dollars guaranty, until it can be replaced by a chattel mortgage on the furniture.

A supplemental complaint was filed by leave of court, asking recovery of rent for the third month (July), accrued after the commencement of the action. Perhaps the subject-matter was not properly brought into the case, but the defendants answered the supplemental complaint on the merits, and went to trial without making any objection to the presentation of evidence offered to sustain the allegations of the pleadings. They cannot be permitted to raise the objection for the first time after judgment. (Groom v. Bangs, 153 Cal. 456 , [ 96 Pac. 503 ].)

The judgment includes rents for the entire month of July, 1913. It appears that the lessor demanded and the tenant surrendered possession of the premises about the middle of that month. The appellants contend that there should be a proportionate abatement of the July rent. The respondent has stipulated that such abatement may be allowed and we need not therefore pass upon the correctness of the contention thus made. Pursuant to this stipulation the judgment against both the lessee, Mrs. Oswald, and Frevert-Bledsoe Furniture Company, the guarantor, should be reduced to $867.50.

It is ordered that the judgment be modified as above indicated and that as so modified it stand affirmed.

The order denying a new trial is affirmed.

The appellants are not to recover costs.