Jacobson

Jacobson v. Pope & Talbot

Good Law
1932 Cal. LEXIS 515·214 Cal. 758·7 P.2d 1017
Supreme Court of CaliforniaFebruary 1, 1932Docket No. S.F. 13517.California2,367 words

Opinion

Dissenting Opinion

Waste, J.

I dissent. The majority opinion rests upon the, to me, false reasoning that, because the Barkers could have declared a valid homestead on the property at any time before they sold it to Jacobson, and thereby have relieved the property from the lien of respondents ’ attachments, but did not do so, the appellant, who purchased the land subject to the lien of the attachments, may do what the respondents’ debtor failed to do and, by making a declaration of homestead subsequent to his buying the land, accomplish that very object. “The object of the homestead law is to protect the homesteader and those dependent upon him or her, in the enjoyment of a domicile not exceeding $5,000 in value, and to this end a liberal construction of the law and facts will be indulged by courts. When the object has been accomplished courts will not suffer this salutary statute to be used as a shield behind which those who would deal Unjustly with creditors may find refuge.” (Marelli v. Keating, 208 Cal. 528 [ 282 Pac. 793 ].) The effect of the majority opinion, if it is to be the law, is to subject claims like those of respondents to defeat through the operation of two or more homesteads, each of the value…

Lead Opinion

The plaintiff appeals from that portion of a decree which quiets his title to a described parcel of real property “subject” to certain attachment liens in favor of the defendants.

Marion Barker and Ruth Barker, husband and wife, originally owned the property here involved in joint tenancy. What purports to be a declaration of homestead covering the same was recorded by them on January 5, 1928. In various actions instituted by the defendants herein against Marion Barker certain writs of attachment were thereafter issued and levied upon his interest in the property. On May 11, 1928, he and his wife, for a valuable consideration, transferred and conveyed the property to the plaintiff. On July 7, 1928, the plaintiff and his wife executed and recorded a declaration of homestead upon the property which has never been abandoned and the validity of which is apparently conceded. The attachment liens of the defendants continue to remain of record, and the plaintiff brings this action to quiet his title.

Sections 1240 and 1241 of the Civil Code provide, in substance, that a homestead is exempt from execution or forced sale except in satisfaction of judgments obtained, “1. Before the…

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