Estate of Jobson

Good Law
164 Cal. 312·1912 Cal. LEXIS 346·128 P. 938
Supreme Court of CaliforniaDecember 10, 1912Sac. No. 1927.California2,947 words

Opinion

Dissenting Opinion

Shaw, J.

I dissent. In my opinion the true principles governing the construction and application of statutes providing for the adoption of children is that the natural relation and the laws governing it, are thereby altered and affected only so far as the statute of adoption by its terms declares or provides, either expressly or by necessary "implication, and no farther. Like an invading force upon a hostile domain, it prevails and controls only so far as its lines extend. Beyond those limits all remain under the original control.

The Newman case ( 75 Cal. 213 , [ 16 Pac. 887 ]), declaring that an adopted child inherits from the adopting parent, the Johnson case ( 98 Cal. 536 , [21 L. R. A. 380, 33 Pac. 460 ]), holding that such child is entitled, as an heir, to administer on the adopting parent’s estate, and the Winchester case ( 140 Cal. 468 , [ 77 Pac. 10 ]), that the child’s share is exempt from inheritance to the same extent as that of a natural child, all depending on the same principle of heirship, go to the extreme verge of the invading force of the adoption statute. The reason for these decisions is plain and is found in the statute itself. The descent is cast at the moment of…

Concurring Opinion

Lorigan, J.

I concur in the views expressed by Justice Shaw in the foregoing dissenting opinion.

Lead Opinion

Sloss, J.

Appeal from an order denying a petition for partial distribution.

The decedent, Frederick Cox Jobson, was the legitimate child of E. C. Jobson, the appellant, and Jennie A. Jobson, his wife. In April, 1889, Frederick Cox Jobson, then three years of age, was adopted by his maternal grandfather, Frederick Cox. The adoption proceedings, which took place in the county of Sacramento, where all of the parties concerned resided, were regular and valid, having been conducted in strict conformity with the requirements of the Civil Code. (Secs. 221 to 230.) Both the father and the mother duly consented in writing to the adoption, as did the wife of Frederick Cox. Thereafter Frederick Cox Jobson became, and until his death remained, a member of the family of said Frederick Cox and his wife, Jennie Cox.

On March 25, 1906, Frederick Cox, the adopting father, died testate, having bequeathed a legacy of ten thousand dollars to his adopted son. In June, 1909, Frederick Cox Job-son, the adopted son, died intestate, owning no property except a portion of the legacy which had been bequeathed to him by Frederick Cox. He left surviving a widow, Sue C. Jobson (the respondent herein), his father in…

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