McDonald

George McDonald, plaintiff and respondent, moves to dismiss the appeal of defendant from the judgment against her and “from that part of the judgment being the intermediate order denying defendant’s motion to set aside default. ’ ’

The facts as disclosed by the certificate of the clerk and by respondent’s uncontradicted affidavit are as follows: The judgment granting an interlocutory decree of divorce to plaintiff from defendant upon the ground of extreme cruelty was rendered on the twenty-seventh day of October, 1913, and entered in the appropriate judgment book of the county clerk’s office on the following day. The notice of appeal was filed February 13, 1914. It is accompanied by no evidence of service upon the adverse party. On October 7, 1913, the court had entered the default of the defendant, and on the fifteenth day of the same month, after a full hearing upon defendant’s motion to set aside the default, the said motion had been denied. Defendant appeared personally with her counsel at the trial, introduced evidence in opposition to the allegation of the complaint, and her counsel examined and cross-examined witnesses. The bill of exceptions signed by the judge who tried…