This cause was taken over after decision in the District Court of Appeal, First District, Division Two, in order that we might more fully consider certain assignments of alleged error on the part of the trial judge in his conduct of the case. Upon an examination of the entire record, including the evidence, we are satisfied with, and adopt as and for the decision of this court, the following portions of the opinion of the District Court of Appeal, prepared by Mr. Presiding Justice Nourse:

We find no error in the giving of the instruction on contributory negligence. The issue was brought in to the case by way of affirmative defense. In support of its allegations thereon the defendants introduced evidence tending to show that the destroyed warehouse had been built more than forty years, had been of wooden frame construction with a wooden floor, and that at the time of the fire had contained many sacks of grain, feed, beet pulp, and other readily inflammable products. Without passing upon the weight or sufficiency of this evidence, we are satisfied that its presence warranted the giving of the instruction now assailed.

Appellants complain of a ruling limiting their cross-examination of an expert witness. The hypothetical question to which an objection was sustained not only failed to state the facts as shown by the evidence, but assumed facts contrary to the uncontradicted and established facts of the ease. The question was not propounded to test the qualifications of the witness. Under the circumstances, and in view of the discretion vested in a trial court in this particular, we find no impropriety in the ruling. (Roche v. Baldwin, 143 Cal. 186, 192 [ 76 Pac. 956 ]; MacCoy v. Gage, 38 Cal. App. 672, 674 [ 177 Pac. 296 ].) Moreover, appellants by their next succeeding, and properly framed, question achieved the desired result.

In conclusion, we are satisfied from an examintion of the entire record that the trial court was not guilty of prejudicial misconduct by reason of certain remarks complained of by the appellants. A trial judge is not to be unduly and unreasonably hampered and restricted in the exercise of control over the proper examination of witnesses and the conduct of the trial generally. Considerable latitude is, and must be, accorded to him in this regard. We fail to discover wherein the trial judge in the present case exceeded the bounds, to the prejudice of the appellants.

The judgment is affirmed.

Curtis, J., Shenk, J., Thompson, J., Tyler, J., pro tern., and Knight, J., pro tem., concurred.