Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the city of Los Angeles from removing a certain industrial spur-track maintained by the plaintiff railway company as a part of its electric railway system on Santa Monica Boulevard in the city of Los Angeles. This spur-track serves the manufacturing plant of the plaintiff brick company, which is situated on property adjacent to Santa Monica Boulevard. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ application for an injunction pendente lite, set aside a temporary restraining order which had been previously granted, sustained a demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend, and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs thereupon prosecuted this appeal.

Defendant seeks to support the judgment and order of the trial court upon the ground that there has at no time existed any legal authority for the building and maintenance of the spur-track in question.

The spur-track was constructed in June, 1909, in what was, at that time, unincorporated territory of the county of Los Angeles. It is claimed that the said spur-track was built pursuant to the terms of an ordinance of the Los Angeles County board of supervisors granting a franchise to the predecessor of plaintiff railway company, which provided “that the right of way be, and the same is hereby granted to E. P. Clark, and his assigns, over and along the public highways of the county of Los Angeles in this ordinance named [including Santa Monica Boulevard] for the period of fifty years from and after the passage hereof, for the purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating a single or double track railway thereon, for passengers, freight, United States mail and baggage; . . . together with the right to construct all switches, turnouts, power houses and other appliances, properties, structures and attachments that may be necessary for the purpose of operating said road and enabling it to be as efficient as the best electric roads.”

It is contended, on behalf. of defendant, that the words of this ordinance are not adequate to authorize the construe tion and maintenance of the spnr-track here in question. [1] This contention must be sustained. [2] No principle of law is better settled than that corporate privileges, which are not ordinarily and necessarily an incident of the corporate-franchise, can be held to prevail over public rights only when it plainly and explicitly appears that such privileges have been, in fact, granted. (Helena Water Works Co. v. Helena, 195 U. S. 383 , [ 49 L. Ed. 245 , 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40, see, also, Rose’s U. S. Notes] ; Indianapolis etc. Ry. Co. v. Citizens’ St. Ry. Co., 127 Ind. 369 , 24 N. E. 1054, 1062 ; Capital City Light etc. Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 42 Fla. 462 , [ 28 South. 810 ].) The language of the franchise in question here does not, in terms, nor by any fair implication, contemplate and confer the authority to construct and maintain an industrial or any other spur-track by the railroad company. With reference to trackage facilities, the only adjuncts to the main line expressly permitted by the franchise are “turnouts” and “switches.” As ordinarily understood and employed, the words “turnouts” and “switches” are in a measure interchangeable. In railroad parlance a “switch” consists of “two parallel lengths of rails joined together by rods, pivoted at one end, and free to move at the other end, forming a part of the track at its junction with a branch or siding. . . . Such a switch may be used to connect several lines of rails.” (Century Dictionary). A “turnout” is a short side-track—a siding, having connection with the main-line track, upon which one train may be switched to permit another train to pass on the mainline track. (Century Dictionary; City of Philadelphia v. River Front Co., 133 Pa. 134 , [ 19 Atl. 356 ]; Borough of Bridgewater v. Beaver etc. Co., 214 Pa. 343 , [ 63 Atl. 796 ] ; Erie R. Co. v. Steward, 61 App. Div. 480 , [ 70 N. Y. Supp. 698 ].) Clearly, therefore, the “turnouts” and “switches” permitted by the franchise in question are no more than the customary short tracks which are usually resorted to for the purpose of enabling and facilitating main-line train movement. On the other hand, a spur-track is “a short track leading from a line of railway, and connected with it at one end only” (Century Dictionary), and may be said, as a matter of common knowledge, to be a track which is projected and extended laterally or at an angle to the main line and is not an adjunct usual or necessary to the primary operation of main-line trains and cars. Obviously, therefore, a spur-track is distinctly different in its purpose and use from a “turnout” or a “switch.” A reading of the franchise in question fails utterly to reveal any other words or phrases which may be said to contemplate and grant the authority to construct an industrial spur-track, and, in the absence thereof, it must be held that it was not the intention of the board of supervisors, nor the purpose and effect of the franchise, to grant, without more ado, the right to construct industrial spur-tracks.

It is contended, however, upon behalf of appellants, that, apart from and without regard to the terms of the franchise in question, authority to construct and maintain the spur-track in question is to be found in the provisions of sections 465 and 470 of the Civil Code, and that, in any event, in the face of the facts pleaded in the complaint the city is es-topped from interfering with the maintenance of the said spur-track. Upon this phase of the case we are in accord with the discussion and disposition of it by Mr. Justice Sloane, of the second division of the district court of appeal for the second district, and therefore adopt his opinion and conclusions as the opinion of this court, which are as follows:

[4] “Appellants make the further point that the city of Los Angeles is estopped to deny the right of the plaintiff railway company to maintain this spur-track. Attention is called to the fact as shown by the record that the spur-track was constructed and put in operation in June, 1909; that, it came within the city limits by annexation of the locality in which it was situated in October of that year, and has been maintained and operated ever since, until September 1, 1911, without protest or interference; that the plaintiff Simons Brick Company, in reliance upon the maintenance of this spur, has built up an extensive business dependent on the spur-track for its service; and that expensive improvements have been made by the plaintiffs, at the instance of the city, to conform the spur-track to the paving and grading requirements of the city on Santa Monica Boulevard. In fact, a strong showing is made for the application of the equitable doctrine of estoppel, if the city of Los Angeles and the public interests concerned are in a position to be subject to estoppel by_ conduct and acquiescence. But, as is said in Gardella v. County of Amador, 164 Cal. 555 , [ 129 Pac. 993 ] : ‘The doctrine of estoppel cannot, we think, be applied so as to validate, as against the public, grants in excess of the limited powers conferred upon the public agents who assumed to make them. ’ If the right to an easement on Santa Monica Boulevard arises solely from the provisions of the Civil Code, subject only to its ratification by the city of Los Angeles, then the city is without power to extend the rights of plaintiffs either by its positive act or passive acquiescence. If it is subject to power vested in the city under section 2 of its charter, for permitting the construction of spur or side tracks, then it would be subject to revocation under the proviso of the same section that all permits granted thereunder ‘shall be revocable at the pleasure of the council. ’ In either event, whether the city was without power by direct action to authorize the building of this spur, or, having the power, was privileged at any time to revoke its consent, we do not see how it could be held by estoppel to an obligation which it could not assume by express agreement, or which, if assumed, it could revoke at its pleasure. (Detroit v. Detroit City R. R. Co., 56 Fed. 867; St. Louis A. & T. H. R. R. Co. v. Belleville, 122 Ill. 376 , [ 12 N. E. 680 ] ; Ashland v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 105 Wis. 398 , [ 80 N. W. 1101 ];. Sutro v. Pettit, 74 Cal. 336 , [ 5 Am. St. Rep. 442 , 16 Pac. 7 ] ; City Railroad Co. v. Citizens’ St. R. R. Co., 166 U. S. 566 , [ 41 L. Ed. 1114 , 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 653, see, also, Rose’s U. S. Notes].)

‘ ‘The facts as set out in the pleadings do not entitle plaintiffs to the relief demanded.”

The order and judgment appealed from are affirmed.

Wilbur, J;, Shaw, J., Angellotti, C. J., Olney, J., Lawlor, J., and Kerrigan, J., pro tem., concurred.