Appeal prom Judgment—Rendition Prior to Amendment op 1907— Subsequent Appeal—Review op Evidence.—When a judgment was rendered prior to the amendment of 1907, substituting the word “entry” instead of the previous word “rendition,” an appeal from the judgment is governed by the previously existing law, and the evidence may be reviewed thereon, if the appeal is taken within sixty days after its rendition, though taken fifty days subsequent to such amendment.

Id.—“Use” op Bill op Exceptions Settled on Motion por New Trial. —A bill of exceptions settled to be used on motion for á new trial is used on the motion within the meaning of the law as to the “use” thereof on appeal from the judgment.

Id.—Grounds por Ruling not Part op Order Denying New Trial-Presumption-—Review of Evidence.—While, in this case, the order denying the motion for a new trial was made upon expressed grounds, which, if correct, would have justified a dismissal rather than the overruling of the motion, yet the motion having been in fact denied, this court must assume that the order was made upon the merits, and statements or recitals in it constitute no part of the showing on which the motion was based, and the record being before the court, it is in a position to pass upon the evidence.

Negligence—Master and Servant—Temporary Employment op Inexperienced Servant—-Failure to Warn op Danger.—Where a servant regularly employed for other work was ordered to take charge of dangerous work, in respect to which he had no experience, by a managing foreman, who knew the dangerous character of the work, and who gave the servant no warning of the danger from a caustic preparation, from the splash of which he lost an eye, the master is responsible for the resulting injury.

Id.—Manager op Department a Vice-Principal.—The manager of a department of a factory who had power to control the plaintiff’s immediate superior and to order him to furnish men, including the plaintiff, to work in the tanks, and who prepared the place in which plaintiff was to work, and gave him the implements with which to perform his task, is a vice-principal, and his negligence in failing to warn plaintiff of the danger was the negligence of the corporation defendant as principal.

Id.—Assumption op Ordinary Risks Matter op Depense—Pleading. —The assumption of the ordinary risks of his employment by the plaintiff is matter of defense which must be pleaded as such, else it cannot be ruled upon.

Id.—Knowledge of Bisk not Presumed.—The tank being in a different room from that in which plaintiff had been employed, he could not be presumed to know the manner in which the mixing tank was operated nor the purpose for which it was used, and it cannot be said, as matter of law, that he assumed the risks of Ms temporary occupation.

Id.—Knowledge of Special Danger a Question of Pact for Jury.— Whether the plaintiff did have knowledge of the special danger or not was a question of fact for the jury.

Id.—Means of Propelling Caustic into Eye Immaterial.—It makes no difference what means operated to propel the caustic solution into the plaintiff’s eye, provided the plaintiff was not negligent, if the defendant was negligent in failing to instruct the plaintiff with reference to the caustic properties of the liquid.

Id.—Explosion—Conflict of Evidence.—There being a conflict of evidence as to whether there was an unusual explosion or not, the existence of such explosion cannot be assumed as the cause of the injury to plaintiff’s eye.

Id.—Duty of Warning not Dependent on Knowledge of Plaintiff’s Ignorance.—The duty of the defendant to warn the plaintiff, who was for the first time placed in the tanks, of the danger in which he was involved, does not depend on the defendant’s knowledge of plaintiff’s ignorance and inexperience, it being the undisputed fact that he had no previous opportunity of knowledge.

Id.—Absence of Error in Instructions.—Held, that there was no error in the instructions of the court, taken together as a whole, which stated correct rules of law for the guidance of the jury.