Flynn

This is an action for divorce. Plaintiff was awarded an interlocutory decree, from which defendant appeals. The judgment was reversed by the district court of appeal of the third district, solely on the ground that there was no express finding that plaintiff had resided in the state or in the county in which the action was brought for the periods specified in section 128 of the Civil Code, that section providing that “a divorce must not be granted unless the plaintiff has been a resident of the state one year, and of the county in which the action is brought three months, next preceding the commencement of the action,” and also that there was no evidence adduced on the trial to show such residence. The decision of the district court of appeal was vacated and the ease ordered transferred to this court for determination because we were not satisfied as to the correctness of certain views expressed by that court in its opinion.

Plaintiff’s complaint contains a sufficient allegation of residence in accord with the provisions of said section 128 of the Civil Code, it being alleged that “said plaintiff resides in the City and County of San Francisco, State of California, and has…

I dissent. I think the ease comes within the rule of section 4½ of article VI of the constitution. Furthermore the ease was hotly contested in the lower court. There was no collusion. The lack of corroborative evidence was not urged below. The objection should not be allowed to prevail on appeal. It is clearly the result of an after-thought.