The appeal in this case was taken in the first instance to the district court of appeal, first district, division one. Inasmuch as it was a case in equity, that court, not being vested with appellate jurisdiction in such cases, ordered it transferred to this court for hearing and decision. On the same day an order was made by this court, under the provisions of section 4, article YI, of the constitution, and section 52a, subdivision 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure, transferring said cause to the district court of appeal for hearing and decision. It is now here for decision after an order made granting a petition for hearing. Two points were earnestly urged by petitioner which seemed to us to require the consideration of this court. The first was whether the plaintiff was entitled to have certain issues framed by the pleadings submitted to a jury, as a matter of right, and the second point was whether the appellant had established such a vested right in the policy of insurance, which forms the basis of the action, as to have taken away the right of the husband to change the original beneficiary named in said policy of insurance. Upon further examination into those questions, however, we are satisfied with the soundness of the reasoning of the district court of appeal and with its conclusion in disposing of them as well as all other questions raised by the petition. We therefore adopt the opinion of the district court of appeal, written by Mr. Justice Knight, as a full and fair disquisition of the questions raised by the appeal. We will later advert, by way of emphasis, briefly to the two questions specifically referred to. The opinion follows:

In the instant case, it evidently appeared to the trial court that there was no satisfactory evidence of a contract inuring to the benefit of the assured and the appellant, but there is evidence of an obligation owed by the assured to the respondent. “In the absence of a contract of some character inuring to the benefit of a beneficiary, the mere fact of payment of assessments by such an one is not sufficient to create equities in his favor, for the courts of the land say that such payments are to be treated as gifts.” (Jory v. Supreme Council, supra.)

It is no doubt the settled law of this state that, where the premiums on an insurance policy issued on the life of a husband after coverture are paid entirely from community funds, the policy is a community asset, and, in view of the provisions of section 172 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot make a valid gift thereof without the written consent of the wife;, and that where the husband attempts to do so, by naming a third party as beneficiary, the transaction as to the wife’s share is voidable and subject to her right of revocation. This principle, however, has no application to the facts of the instant case, inasmuch as there is evidence in the record tending to support the implied finding of the trial court that the designation of the respondent as beneficiary of the proceeds of the policy was made by the assured for a valuable consideration.

Whether the loan of $1,000, made upon the two occasions adverted to by the district court of appeal, would alone be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 172 of the Civil Code, as to a valuable consideration, nevertheless, in the light of the brother’s situation and the transactions and relations that existed between him and his sister, they are not without weight taken in connection with the care, support, maintenance and nursing which the brother received from mother and sister while ill, and also other accommodations thereafter furnished him upon his subsequent return to their home—matters doubtless within the contemplation of the brother at the time he conceived the purpose of substituting the sister for the wife—and may be sufficient to support the implied finding that there existed a valuable consideration for the substitution of the sister for the wife in the policy.

We are of the opinion that sufficient consideration has heretofore been given to all the questions raised upon the appeal.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Richards, J., Waste, J., Lawlor, J., Lennon, J., and Shenk, J., concurred.

Rehearing denied.