United States v. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co.

The United States sued the Santa Fe Railway under 45 U.S.C. § 64a(a) for *1185 statutory penalties for violations of the railroad Hours of Service Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 61 -64b. The only question is what Congress meant when it used the term “designated terminal” in 45 U.S.C. § 61 (b)(3). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court refused to impose the penalties and entered judgment for the Santa Fe. United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., N.D.Cal., 1973, 363 F.Supp. 644 . The government appeals, and we reverse.

I. The Facts.

The facts were stipulated. At 4:30 a. m. on February 14, 1971, the crew of Santa Fe’s “Extra 3427 East” train went on duty at Richmond, California, the crew’s “home terminal.” The four crew members — an engineer, two brakemen, and a conductor — had all been off duty for at least 24 hours. At 4:55 a. m. “Extra 3427 East” and crew left Richmond for Riverbank, California, the crew’s “away-from-home” terminal. About four hours later, at 8:50 a. m., they arrived at Mormon Yard, Stockton, California, a major switching point, and stopped there to permit the interchange of cars with connecting carriers. At 9:05 a. m. all four…

(dissenting):

With due respect, I dissent and would adopt the language of the district court:

United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 363 F.Supp. 644, 648 (N.D.Cal.1973).

I would hold that any Santa Fe terminal as defined in the collective bargaining agreement which meets the minimum food and lodging standards is a designated terminal for the purposes of this Act unless the relevant collective bargaining agreement specifically excludes it.

The majority observes, Note 1, that grievance procedures were available to the train crew, that they were paid for the run in question and for the time spent in Stockton, and that they made no complaint and filed no grievance. I disagree with the conclusion that these “are facts which do not bear directly on the merits of the issue in this case.” Rather, they convince me that the interpretation of the term “designated terminal,” as applied to a specific run, should be left to the collective bargaining process.

There are times when a court should look to ways in which persons have reacted in response to a statute as an aid to interpreting the statute’s meaning. The analysis used by the late Professor Henry Hart and…

525 F.2d 1184 22 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 667, 78 Lab.Cas. P 33,320 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY CO., Defendant-Appellee. No. 74--1061. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Nov. 10, 1975. Howard T. Chang, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), and Paul J. Fitzpatrick, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant. C. George Niebank, Jr., John P. Frestel, Frestel & Niebank (argued), Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee. Lawrence M. Mann (argued), Bernstein, Alper, Schoene & Friedman, Washington, D.C., for amicus (UTU). OPINION Before DUNIWAY, ELY and WRIGHT, Circuit Judges. DUNIWAY, Circuit Judge. 1 The United States sued the Santa Fe Railway under 45 U.S.C. § 64a(a) for statutory penalties for violations of the railroad Hours of Service Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 61 --64b. The only question is what Congress meant when it used the term 'designated terminal' in 45 U.S.C. § 61 (b)(3). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court refused to impose the penalties and entered judgment for the Santa Fe. United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.,…