OPINION

This appeal by the Government from an order dismissing indictment is back before us on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States. When it was before us the first time, 503 F.2d 291 (9th Cir.1974), we held that the Government could not appeal dismissal of the indictment against appellees under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 , since further prosecution would place them twice in jeopardy. Writ of certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court, resulting in an order vacating our judgment and remanding the cause “for further consideration in the light of Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 , 95 S.Ct. 1055 , 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975).” 421 U.S. 996 , 95 S.Ct. 2392 , 44 L.Ed.2d 663 (1975).

The facts on the basis of which the district court ordered dismissal of the indictment are discussed in our earlier opinion. It suffices here to say that trial of appellees resulted in a hung jury and declaration of mistrial, and that prior to retrial the district court granted appellees’ motion to dismiss the indictment. Relying on evidence presented at the trial the court ruled as matter of law that the Government, through its authorized agents, had given its consent to the actions of appellees on which the indictment was based.

In Serfass v. United States, supra, the indictment, charging refusal to submit to induction into the armed forces, was dismissed prior to trial on the ground that the Selective Service file disclosed a prima facie case for relief. The Court, at 387, 95 S.Ct. at 1062 , quoted Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957), to the effect that: “ ‘The constitutional prohibition against “double jeopardy” was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense . . . The Court ruled:

420 U.S. at 389 , 95 S.Ct. at 1063 . The Court accordingly held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar appeal by the United States under § 3731.

That ruling, however, does not apply to the case now before us. Here appellees have undergone trial. There is no question but that jeopardy has attached. That being so, and since the proceedings in the district court have ended in appellees’ favor and the consequences of a reversal in favor of the Government would be that appellees must be tried again, we conclude that they would, on retrial, be placed twice in jeopardy. In this we rely upon two recent decisions of the Supreme Court handed down shortly before Serfass and after our earlier decision: United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 , 95 S.Ct. 1006 , 43 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975), and United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 , 95 S.Ct. 1013 , 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975).

In Wilson , trial had resulted in a guilty verdict. Defendant had made a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment upon the ground of delay in bringing him to trial. The motion had been denied. Following trial he had filed various motions, including ones for arrest of judgment and judgment of acquittal. The district court reversed its earlier ruling and dismissed the indictment on the ground that the preindictment delay was unreasonable and had prejudiced the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court held appellate review of this determination was not barred since the defendant would not have to undergo a second trial; reversal on appeal would merely serve to reinstate the guilty verdict. The Court stated: “[W]e agree with the Government that the constitutional protection against Government appeals attaches only where there is a danger of subjecting the defendant to a second trial for the same offense * * *” 420 U.S. at 336, 95 S.Ct. at 1018. Discussing the importance of avoiding this danger, the Court said:

Id. at 343, 95 S.Ct. at 1022 (footnote omitted).

In Jenkins , a full trial to the court without jury had been had and findings of fact had been made by the court. A question was presented by the fact that the law of the circuit at the time of the offense had, since the offense, been changed by a decision of the Supreme Court. The district court ruled that the Supreme Court decision should not be given retroactive effect and dismissed the indictment under the former circuit rule. The Government appealed, seeking reversal of this ruling. With reference to the Government’s position, the Court stated:

420 U.S. at 367, 95 S.Ct. at 1011. The Court rejected this argument, saying:

Id. at 368, 95 S.Ct. at 1012.

Further discussing the Government’s position, the Court stated:

Id. at 368-69, 95 S.Ct. at 1012 (footnotes omitted).

The Court concluded:

Id. at 369-70 , 95 S.Ct. at 1013.

On the basis of this authority we conclude that reversal here would subject ap pellees to double jeopardy, and that the appeal accordingly must be dismissed under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 .

It is of no consequence that retrial on remand here would be necessitated not by alleged judicial intervention and error but by the fact that the jury on the first trial was unable to agree. We recognize that at that point, following mistrial, retrial would not have constituted double jeopardy, even without consent of appellees, since “there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.” United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). Without retrial the judicial process would be frustrated; the dispute would be at stalemate. Here, however, mistrial was followed by a judicial action terminating the trial in appellees’ favor. As the Court noted in Jenkins : “ * * * it is of critical importance whether the proceedings in the trial court terminate in a mistrial * * * or in the defendant’s favor * * *420 U.S. at 365, n. 7, 95 S.Ct. at 1011.

Appeal dismissed.

. That section authorizes appeal by the Government “from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information * * * except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.”