United States v. Steven Linwood Robinson

This appeal presents the question: Can founded suspicion, unlike probable cause, be based solely on the receipt by the stopping officer of a radio dispatch to stop the described vehicle, without any proof of the factual foundation for the relayed message? We hold that it cannot.

Robinson appeals from his conviction for interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 . The district court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained after the vehicle that Robinson was driving was stopped by Officer Holland, a state police officer. Robinson claimed that the evidence was the fruit of a stop that was not justified by founded suspicion and thus was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

On the evening of September 25, 1975, Officer Holland received a radio message from the Kingman, Arizona police dispatcher advising him to be on the lookout for a possible stolen 1976 Oldsmobile Cutlass, Nevada license CKC 434. Officer Holland testified that at the time he received the message, he believed that the dispatcher had obtained some information from an inspector at the Agricultural Inspection Station located at the Nevada-Arizona…

(dissenting).

This case involves the right to stop and nothing more — if the stop was valid, the arrest was valid, and the search, a lawful incident of it, was valid.

I think that the rule should be that a police officer possessed of information given by a police dispatcher is entitled to stop on the basis of that information in the absence of evidence that the stopping officer did not act in good faith or that the whole of what was done was done for the purpose of avoiding the requirements of the fourth amendment. I take it that the majority does not quarrel with this rule.

I do not believe that the act of a stopping officer which was reasonably done by him when done should be held to be tainted by later revelations that his informants were themselves inadequately informed. In short, in a stop case I would judge the conduct of the stopping officer and no more.

The Constitution does not mandate the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S.Ct. 1359 , 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949), Mr. Justice Frankfurter said at 28, 69 S.Ct. at 1361 :

As I understand it, the exclusionary rule was designed as a prophylactic rule — one which would deter…

536 F.2d 1298 UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Steven Linwood ROBINSON, Appellant. No. 75-3727. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. June 16, 1976. David M. Ochoa, Asst. Federal Public Defender (argued), Phoenix, Ariz., for appellant. Ron Jennings, Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), Phoenix, Ariz., for appellees. OPINION Before HUFSTEDLER and CHOY, Circuit Judges, and SMITH, * District Judge. HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judge: 1 This appeal presents the question: Can founded suspicion, unlike probable cause, be based solely on the receipt by the stopping officer of a radio dispatch to stop the described vehicle, without any proof of the factual foundation for the relayed message? We hold that it cannot. 2 Robinson appeals from his conviction for interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 . The district court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained after the vehicle that Robinson was driving was stopped by Officer Holland, a state police officer. Robinson claimed that the evidence was the fruit of a stop that was not justified by founded suspicion and thus was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 3 On the evening of…