United States v. Gary Charles Isaacs

The defendant was convicted of making a false statement in connection with the acquisition of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (a)(6). At the time of the purchase defendant had been charged with the crime of second degree assault by an information filed in Superior Court of Yakima County, Washington, and then pending. The penalty for second degree assault may exceed one year in prison. The defendant signed Form 4473, part of which contained a question and answer as follows:

The Government form contains no definition of the word “indictment” nor does it contain anything else which touches on the meaning of the word. The sale by a licensed dealer of a firearm to a person who has been indicted may be a crime under Section 922(d)(1) and a false answer to the question of whether the purchaser was under indictment would deceive a licensed dealer as to the lawfulness of the sale. That deception is the crime charged here under Section 922(a)(6).

18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(14) provides:

27 C.F.R. § 178.11 provides in part:

The question which we deem to be dispositive of the case is whether the defendant made a false statement. 1 We think that he did not.

An indictment is…

(specially concurring):

I concur, but I believe that the record would justify a finding that Isaacs intended to deceive the seller, and I am satisfied that Isaacs is just the sort of person Congress had in mind when it enacted the statute. However, we are not at liberty to rewrite an act of Congress; and Isaacs had not been “indicted”. This is not a case in which we can read into the pending indictment the statutory definition; nor can we say that “ignorance of the law is no excuse.” The government has not alleged that Isaacs knew or consciously avoided knowing that “indictment includes information.” Cf., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc). Without some such allegation, there is no charge with matching proof that Isaacs knew he was speaking falsely.

The mens rea requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (a)(6), i. e. knowingly making a false statement, distinguishes this case from Schook v. United States, 337 F.2d 563 (8th Cir. 1964), and other “transportation of firearms” cases. Under the statutes involved in those cases, it was not critical to conviction for the accused to have actually known that reference to an “indictment” also covered an “information”. It…

539 F.2d 686 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gary Charles ISAACS, Defendant-Appellant. No. 76-1035. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Aug. 5, 1976. 1 David A. Thorner, Yakima, Wash., for defendant-appellant. 2 Dean C. Smith, U. S. Atty., and Robert S. Linnell, Asst. U. S. Atty., Spokane, Wash., for plaintiff-appellee. OPINION 3 Before ELY and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges, and SMITH, * District Judge. RUSSELL E. SMITH, District Judge: 4 The defendant was convicted of making a false statement in connection with the acquisition of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (a)(6). At the time of the purchase defendant had been charged with the crime of second degree assault by an information filed in Superior Court of Yakima County, Washington, and then pending. The penalty for second degree assault may exceed one year in prison. The defendant signed Form 4473, part of which contained a question and answer as follows: 5 a. Are you under indictment in any court for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year? NO. 6 The Government form contains no definition of the word "indictment" nor does it contain anything else which touches on…