OPINION

The issue in this appeal is whether Les Mares Enterprises, Inc. (hereafter “Les Mares”) was an “employer engaged in a business affecting commerce” and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ( 29 U.S.C. § 651 , et seq.) (hereafter the “Act”). We hold that Les Mares was such an employer and we reverse the decision of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (hereafter the “Commission”).

In late 1972, Les Mares owned several hundred acres of Napa Valley land, and it had employees engaged in clearing the land. As part of the. clearing operation it was using a guillotine-like wood-chopping machine. The machine caused repeated employee complaints and accidents, including one incident in which a worker, petitioner Richard Godwin, lost three fingers from his right hand.

Pursuant to a routine inspection conducted by an authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor, Les Mares was cited on March 5, 1973, for a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 654 (a)(1), for failing to furnish its employees “employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm.” Les Mares was served with a proposed penalty of $600 for this violation, and ordered to abate the condition within one day. Les Mares timely contested the citation and proposed penalty, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 659 (c), and a hearing was conducted before one of the Commission’s administrative law judges.

This judge found that there was an effect on interstate commerce and that the Commission therefore had jurisdiction. The judge held that the charged violation was valid. On review of this decision sought by Les Mares, the Commission reversed the administrative law judge. The Commission held that Les Mares was not engaging in a business affecting commerce because at the time of the citation and hearing Les Mares had not completed its plans to plant a vineyard and hence had not engaged in a business affecting commerce.

Les Mares admitted that its purpose in clearing the land was to plant a vineyard, and to sell grapes to wineries or produce wine itself. At the time of the hearing the activities had progressed beyond clearing. The land was being “ripped”, a cultivation process that normally immediately precedes the planting of grapes. However, no vineyards had been planted and Les Mares had not yet determined whether it would do the growing and winemaking itself or lease the land to others for that purpose.

Uneontradicted testimony at the hearing showed that 65-70% of the wine produced in California is shipped out of state, and that at least 25-30%, and possibly up to 50%, of the wine produced in the Napa Valley location of Les Mares’ land is shipped out of state. Testimony also showed that a significant amount of Napa Valley grapes is sold to wineries outside the valley, whose products move in interstate commerce. Also, tourists from out of state frequent Napa Valley wine-tasting rooms, where wine is made available for sale.

I. Scope of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.

29 U.S.C. § 651 sets forth the Congressional statement of findings and declaration of purpose and policy. This section reads, in part:

The background of the Act was described in Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1259 (4 Cir. 1974), as follows:

The Act imposes duties under § 654 on “employers”. 29 U.S.C. § 652 (5) provides, in part: “The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees . . . .”

The phrase “affecting commerce” in this Act has been interpreted by two other circuit courts as an indication that Congress exercised its full powers under the Commerce Clause. United States v. Dye Construction Co., 510 F.2d 78 (10 Cir. 1975), and Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comn, 492 F.2d 1027 (2 Cir. 1974). Dye, at 83, stated that, “The use of the words ‘affecting commerce’ tells us that it was the intent of Congress to exercise fully its constitutional authority under the commerce clause.” (citations) Brennan, at 1030, held similarly and stated:

We hold also that Congress intended the ' coverage of the Act to be as broad as the scope of the commerce clause. 1

II. The “Affecting Commerce” Constitutional Limitation.

The power of the Congress, acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause, to regulate intrastate activities which substantially affect interstate commerce, was perhaps best enunciated by the Supreme Court in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 , 63 S.Ct. 82 , 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942). At issue in Wickard was the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which attempted to control the volume of wheat moving in interstate commerce in order to avoid surpluses and shortages and the consequent abnormally low or high wheat price. The Supreme Court held that:

In the case at bar the activity of clearing land for the purpose of growing grapes is an activity which, if performed under unsafe conditions, will adversely affect commerce. Clearing land is an integral part of the manufacturing of wine, and therefore commerce is affected by the activity. Hodgson v. Ewing, 451 F.2d 526, 528 (5 Cir. 1971). Hodgson held that an employer in the business of clearing brush for the improvement of agricultural land could be regulated by Congress. We note that under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 , et seq., involved in Hodgson , Congress used the phrase “closely related and directly essential” to commerce, a phrase indicating that the Act does not extend to the maximum authority given the Congress under the Commerce Clause. 2 A fortiori the similar activity can be covered by an Act utilizing the broader test, “affecting commerce." See generally, Mandeville Farms v. Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229 , 68 S.Ct. 996 , 92 L.Ed. 1328 (1948).

We do not think it significant that, at the time of the hearing, grapevines had not yet been planted and grapes had not been harvested and turned into wine. The effect on interstate commerce nevertheless exists. The activity undertaken is a necessary part of the growing process of grapes, which activity must be undertaken by all growers. Les Mares’ activity, taken together with land clearing by others, would surely affect commerce if unsafe working conditions were utilized and accidents resulted at all locations. “Even activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, .where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations.” Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 , 95 S.Ct. 1792, 1795 , 44 L.Ed.2d 363 (1975).

Congress recognized that unsafe working conditions existing in one business affected all other businesses similarly situated. Congressman Sikes, a sponsor of the bill, stated:

The effect of permitting one business to use cheaper — but more dangerous — work methods will tend to force competitors to cut their land clearing costs similarly. 3

Also, as a practical matter, to hold that this business did not affect commerce because the business activity had not progressed beyond preparing the land would unduly delay and hinder enforcement of the Act, because the Secretary of Labor would have to wait until grapes had been planted or harvested before citing Les Mares for serious violations of the Act. The land here involved was cleared with the purpose of growing grapes. To wait until planting or harvesting would be a meaningless gesture.

We hold that the clearing of land for the purpose of growing grapes is a business which affects interstate commerce.

REVERSED.

. For two examples where Congress did not choose to exhaust its constitutional powers over commerce, see 10 East 40th St. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578, 579 , 65 S.Ct. 1227, 1228 , 89 L.Ed. 1806 (1945) [“In enacting this statute Congress did not see fit, as it did in other regulatory measures, e. g., the Interstate Commerce Act and the National Labor Relations Act, to exhaust its constitutional power over commerce”] and Mitchell v. H. B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S. 310 , 80 S.Ct. 739 , 4 L.Ed.2d 753 (1960), both cases dealing with the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 , et seq.; and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 , 95 S.Ct. 392 , 42 L.Ed.2d 378 (1974), dealing with the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts, 15 U.S.C. § 14 and § 13(a), respectively.

. See footnote 1, supra.

. Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Com’n, supra, 492 F.2d at 1030 recognized that, . . States and employers insisting on a high degree of safety should not be disadvantaged by the failure of others to do so.” (citations)

See also, e. g., United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 121 , 62 S.Ct. 523, 527 , 86 L.Ed. 726 (1942):