Earl B. Collins, and Cross-Appellants v. Donald H. Rumsfeld, and Cross-Appellees and Other Consolidated Cases

These are cases in which the not unreasonable expectations of the plaintiffs must be disappointed in order to serve the common good as perceived by Congress. This provides little comfort to the plaintiffs who are enlisted naval personnel, but our recognition of this perception of Congress extinguishes any power on our part to intervene.

In brief, the cases amount to this. The plaintiffs, while on active duty in the Navy, entered into agreements to extend their enlistments for an additional two or three years, which additional terms were to commence on various dates, all subsequent to June 1,1974, the effective date of the Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonus Revision Act of 1974. 1 At the time these agreements to extend enlistments were executed the law and applicable regulations authorized the payment of certain bonuses designated as Variable Reenlistment Bonuses (VRB’s). Each plaintiff was induced to agree to extend his enlistment by the prospect of receiving in due course a VRB. Prior to the commencement of a period of extended enlistment with respect to any plaintiff, the applicable law was changed by the Bonus Revision Act of 1974. Each of the plaintiffs, either before or…

(concurring):

I concur with Judge Sneed’s result mainly upon the ground set forth in Part II of his opinion.

In Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393 , 81 S.Ct. 1230 , 6 L.Ed.2d 365 (1961), the Su *1113 preme Court pointed out that “[Cjommonlaw rules governing private contracts have no place in the area of military pay . [a] soldier’s entitlement to pay is dependent upon statutory right.” (Id. at 401, 81 S.Ct. at 1235 ). Quoting from In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 151 , 11 S.Ct. 54 , 34 L.Ed. 636 (1890), the Supreme Court in Bell explained that this is so because, although enlistment is a contract, “[I]t is one of those contracts which changes the status; and, where that is changed, no breach of the contract destroys the new status or relieves from the obligations which its existence imposes” ( 366 U.S. at 402 , 81 S.Ct. at 1235 ) — a drastic rule but one that may be justified by national defense considerations affecting the unique relationship between soldiers and their government.

In Carini v. United States, 528 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1975), the Fourth Circuit pointed out that even the plaintiffs before it conceded that the monthly salary they received was not fixed at the rates in…

542 F.2d 1109 Earl B. COLLINS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. Donald H. RUMSFELD et al., Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees and other consolidated cases. Nos. 75-2935, 75-2967, 75-3238, 75-3432, 75-3348 and 75-3559. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Sept. 27, 1976. Eric A. Seitz (argued), Honolulu, Hawaii, for appellants in No. 75-2935 and appellees in No. 75-2967. Robert E. Kopp, Atty. and Neil H. Koslowe, Atty. (argued), of U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellants in Nos. 75-2967, 75-3238, 75-3432, 75-3559. Scott J. Tepper (argued), of Garfield & Tepper, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellants in Nos. 75-2935, 75-3348 and appellees in Nos. 75-3432, 75-2967, 75-3238, 75-3559. Neil H. Koslowe, Atty. (argued), of U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellees in Nos. 75-2935, 75-3348. Before CHAMBERS and SNEED, Circuit Judges, and SWEIGERT, * District Judge. SNEED, Circuit Judge: 1 These are cases in which the not unreasonable expectations of the plaintiffs must be disappointed in order to serve the common good as perceived by Congress. This provides little comfort to the plaintiffs who are enlisted naval personnel,…