(concurring):

I concur in the opinion of Judge Sneed, but should like to add these remarks.

It is important to state that a subpoena to produce documents may elicit testimonial assertations that pertain to matters quite aside from authentication. By complying with a subpoena, a witness may be forced to communicate his state of mind, his memory, his perception, or his cognition; and such evidence may relate either to the documents to be produced or to entirely different matters. Articulation of this evidence may arise either by the act of delivering the requested materials or by responding to inquiries necessary to insure that there has been full compliance with the subpoena. All such evidence, at least presumptively, should be protected by the fifth amendment, where the other requisite grounds for asserting the privilege have been established.

Fisher v. United States, 96 S.Ct. 1569 (1976), concerned an accountant’s working papers that were objectively identifiable. The testimonial assertion implied in the production of the documents was de minim-is and, as such, was outside the purview of the fifth amendment. In this respect, the working papers of an accountant, such as those at issue in Fisher , may present a special case.

The Fisher case may not apply to other writings or materials, especially those of a more private nature, even where the testimonial assertion does not amount to an implicit authentication. This is not a recognition that the contents of such writings necessarily are protected; rather, it follows from the high probability that an order to produce personal papers may compel assertions or communications that fall within the privilege.

Appellant has made no showing that the considerations mentioned above are present in his case. He argues, instead, that Fisher should not apply because he owns the working papers. I therefore concur in the judgment and opinion of the court.