In this action for damages appellant, Gaye Levy Ayon, claims sex discrimination in her non-selection for a management intern position and retaliatory harassment in her employment, in violation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The district court adopted findings of fact and conclusions of law of a special master and dismissed the complaint, finding that there had been no discrimination in the non-selection of appellant for the management intern position and that the court lacked jurisdiction with respect to the retaliatory harassment claim. We reverse the holding on lack of jurisdiction and remand to the district court for further consideration of this claim.

Background

Appellant, an employee of the United States Forest Service, was employed as a secretary and later as an administrative assistant for the Seattle Federal Executive Board. On March 29, 1972, she filed an application for one of two management intern positions with the General Services Administration (GSA). Appellant’s application was considered with those of two men, the men being selected to fill the positions. The selecting official, William McVay, Director of Administration of GSA for Region 10, found that the two male applicants were more fully qualified than was appellant.

On June 14,1972, appellant filed an informal complaint with the Civil Rights Division of GSA, charging violation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964), in that she had been discriminated against because of her sex. On July 5, 1972 appellant filed a formal complaint against McVay and Roy Vernstrom, Regional Administrator of GSA for Region 10 and chairman of the Federal Executive Board, alleging sex discrimination in her non-selection.

On July 20, 1972, appellant received a letter from the Regional Personnel Officer for the Forest Service, Region 6, advising her that her employment would be terminated effective August 4, 1972, because she had failed to satisfactorily complete her probationary employment period. On August 3, 1972, appellant received another letter advising her that the termination letter of July 20 had been withdrawn and that she had satisfactorily completed her probationary period.

On July 27, 1972, appellant filed a second informal complaint of sex discrimination charging retaliation harassment. On August 10, 1972, she filed a formal complaint alleging, inter alia, that the Forest Service had conspired with GSA to terminate her employment in retaliation for her previous complaint.

On November 22, 1972, appellant received a letter from the Director of Civil Rights of GSA advising her that her complaints had been investigated and that no evidence had been found to support the charges of sex discrimination or harassment. The Director did note, however, that “a full implementation of the agency Equal Employment Opportunity Program should have taken into account ways to correct Region 10’s underutilization of women workers” and informed appellant that she would be offered a management intern position in Region 10 no later than July 1, 1973. Appellant did in fact assume a management intern position on April 1, 1973. In the meantime, she had filed this action on February 6, 1973, seeking review of the agency decision on her sex discrimination complaints.

Proceedings in District Court

Following an extended hearing, the special master entered a detailed oral opinion on November 4, 1974, followed by detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law filed on March 20,1975. The district court, after reviewing the record, adopted the report of the special master in its entirety, together with his findings of fact and conclusions of law. Pursuant to the recommendation of the special master, a judgment of dismissal was entered.

With respect to appellant’s claim of sex discrimination in her non-selection for the management intern position, the special master found, inter alia, that “All three of the candidates were qualified, however, it was reasonable for Mr. McVay to conclude at the time he made his decision that Mr. Henry and Mr. Schildmeyer were more highly qualified for the positions.” The conclusions of law on this claim read:

With respect to the charge of harassment and retaliation, the district court adopted the conclusion of the special master that the court did not have jurisdiction because “Congress did not, in passage of 42 U.S.C. 2000(e)-16, refer to or incorporate the language of the part of the 1964 Civil Rights Act pertaining to harassment and retaliation [42 U.S.C. 2000(e)-3] as they did in incorporating into 42 U.S.C. 2000(e)-16 the language referring to discrimination in hiring, firing and promotion as found in 42 U.S.C. 2000(e)-2.”

Jurisdiction of Retaliation Claim

Appellee confesses error with respect to the conclusion that the court lacked jurisdiction of the claim of retaliation and harassment. We agree with the parties that Congress, in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 and thereby extending the equal employment opportunity provisions of the Civil Rights Act to federal employees, intended to include the protections from harassment and retaliation embodied in the Civil Rights Act.

Section 2000e-16(d) reads:

Section 2000e-5(g) provides in part:

Section 2000e-3(a) is the provision prohibiting retaliation and harassment:

When these sections are read together, it is clear that Congress incorporated the protections against retaliation in its enactment of § 2000e-16.

This conclusion is supported by the statement in House Report No. 92-238 on the proposed enactment of § 2000e-16:

We conclude that in enacting § 2000e-16, Congress intended to, and did incorporate into that section the provisions of the Civil Rights Act prohibiting harassment or retaliation for the exercise of those remedial rights established by the Act. Accordingly we find that the district court had jurisdiction to consider appellant’s charges of retaliation.

Discrimination

Appellant argues, essentially, that where an agency, in the employment context, must choose between a qualified man and a qualified woman, the affirmative action policy established by Executive Order 11478 “suggests a duty to select the woman.” She contends that the affirmative action policy and the underrepresentation of women in the GSA should have been given greater consideration in the selection decision. GSA’s failure to do so, it is argued, raises serious doubt as to its good faith and suggests the presence of subtle discrimination.

Appellee argues that McVay did not select appellant primarily because of her personality problems, and not because of her sex. The Government contends that McVay, in so doing, was following the hiring mandates of 5 C.F.R. 330.101 which states:

Appellee further contends that even if the affirmative action plan is considered, the Government is not required to select a qualified woman over a more qualified man, because to do so would establish preferential hiring quotas which are themselves discriminatory. On balance, we find appellee’s argument more persuasive.

Upon review of the record, we agree with the master’s finding that McVay’s non-selection of appellant was based primarily on her personality problems. We are unable to say that the ability to get along with one’s co-workers would not be an important qualification for an individual in a management position, or that a selecting official could not give substantial weight to that factor in making his selection. While such a selection process is dependent upon the individualized judgment of the selecting official and is therefore subject to opportunities for subtle discrimination, we find none here. That appellant was later selected for an intern position does not alter our view, since the relative qualifications of the applicants for that position are not before this court.

We agree with the district court that nothing in the Affirmative Action Plan or the Equal Employment Opportunity Program requires a federal agency to employ a qualified woman in preference to a more qualified man. Title VII was enacted to eliminate sex as a factor in the employment context, not to establish it as a primary consideration. This intention was codified in a portion of the act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j), which provides:

The Supreme Court has held that Title VII was not enacted to establish preferential hiring practices in favor of those individuals who were previously the subjects of discrimination. In the leading case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-431 , 91 S.Ct. 849, 853 , 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1970), the Court stated:

Of more direct impact to our consideration here, the Court concluded:

We conclude that the evidence fully supported the finding of the district court that sex discrimination did not play a part in appellant’s non-selection for the intern position and that the provisions of Title VII did not require her selection over a more qualified male applicant.

Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing appellant’s claim of sex discrimination in her non-selection for the management intern position. We reverse the holding of the district court that it did not have

jurisdiction of the claim based on retaliation and harassment and reverse and remand for further consideration of this claim.

Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.

. When the complaint was filed and when judgment was entered, appellant was unmarried, her last name being Levy. Apparently she married while the appeal was pending and took her married name of Ayon. . In her complaint appellant named the General Services Administration, United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Region 6, and numerous officials and employees as defendants. In an order entered January 30, 1974, the district court dismissed the action as to all defendants except Arthur F. Sampson, Administrator of General Services Administration, holding that the only appropriate defend ant was the head of the department agency charged with the unlawful discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). The court then appointed a United States Magistrate as special master to conduct a hearing and report to the court, with findings of fact and conclusions of law. The dismissal of the other defendants is not questioned on this appeal. . A management intern is a trainee in a two-year program designed to prepare participants for management positions in GSA. . The special master found that McVay and Vernstrom had encouraged appellant to apply for the position and that McVay had “made effort beyond the routine” to get appellant’s files and documents together so that she could be considered for the position in 1972. . It appears from the master’s oral opinion following hearing that appellant actually was no longer a probationary employee when she received the letter of July 20, and that someone in the Forest Service Personnel Office had made a “mistake”. The master condemned the action as an “inexcusable error”. . The master, in his oral opinion, noted that Mr. Henry, one of the male applicants, was clearly the most qualified of the three. As between appellant and the other male applicant, the master found their qualifications to be substantially similar, concluding that McVay chose between them essentially on the basis of the appellant’s personality problems. Miss Levy’s superior, as well as several persons Miss Levy had listed as references in her application, stated that she had difficulties working with other people, particularly her subordinates. . Executive Order 11478 (August 8, 1969) required each executive department and agency to establish and maintain an affirmative program of equal employment opportunity, and “to provide sufficient resources to administer such a program in a positive and effective manner; assure that recruitment activities reach all sources of job candidates; utilize to the fullest extent the present skills of each employee; provide the maximum feasible opportunity to employees to enhance their skills so they may perform at their highest potential and advance in accordance with their abilities. . . ” [3 C.F.R. p. 804], . The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that Title VII prohibits subtle, as well as overt, discrimination: “In the implementation of such decisions [relating to employment] it is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.” McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 , 93 S.ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).