Richard L. Verrilli, Cross-Appellee v. City of Concord, Cross-Appellant

Plaintiff-Appellant Richard L. Verrilli appeals from a district court determination upholding the constitutionality of certain city ordinances which placed restrictions on political campaign signs. The City of Concord has cross-appealed those portions of the district court decision declaring other ordinances unconstitutional.

At the outset we must determine the proper tests to be applied to judge the validity of the various ordinance restrictions. We are aided by this court’s recent decision in Baldwin v. Redwood City et al., 540 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976) (reh. den. Sept. 14, 1976, pet. for cert. filed Oct. 12, 1976, 45 L.W. 3307), which dealt with a similar regulatory scheme. The Baldwin court stated:

We agree with this statement of the law and the ordinances in question will be analyzed in light of this standard.

I

The district court upheld the validity of § 7417(o)(8)(c) 1 and § 7417(o)(3)(d) 2 which required that any person posting signs deposit a $100.00 cash bond with the city to insure removal of the signs and also that any sign posted found not to be in accordance with the ordinance would be deemed a public nuisance.

We are bound by the points decided in Baldwin v.…

concurring and dissenting.

My dissent is limited to that part of the majority opinion which declares unconstitutional two portions of the ordinance: § 7417(o)(2)(a), the general size and number limitation, and § 7417(o)(4)(c), the size limitation on a headquarters sign.

The majority concedes that similar restrictions were upheld by the court in Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360 (CA9, 1976), but would distinguish the cases on the theory that the conditions in Redwood City are substantially different from those in the City of Concord. I think this distinction is unsound. The cities are on opposite sides of San Francisco Bay and are somewhat less than sixty miles apart. Moreover, the justifications relied upon in Baldwin — “the appearance of the community,” “reducing accumulation of debris,” “minimizing traffic hazard,” and “other legitimate municipal interests” [ 540 F.2d at 1369 ] —were similarly urged by affidavit before the district court here. To this extent, the finding of the district court that the city did not attempt to justify its restrictions is clearly erroneous. F.R.Civ.P. 52(a). The *267 only factor in Baldwin not specifically advanced in the district court here…

548 F.2d 262 Richard L. VERRILLI, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. CITY OF CONCORD, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant. Nos. 75-1542, 75-2157. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Jan. 3, 1977. Wayne Canterbury (argued), of Graham & James, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant/cross-appellee. Mark Commerford, Asst. City Atty. (argued), Concord, Cal., for appellee/cross-appellant. Before MERRILL, KILKENNY and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. J. BLAINE ANDERSON, Circuit Judge: 1 Plaintiff-Appellant Richard L. Verrilli appeals from a district court determination upholding the constitutionality of certain city ordinances which placed restrictions on political campaign signs. The City of Concord has cross-appealed those portions of the district court decision declaring other ordinances unconstitutional. 2 At the outset we must determine the proper tests to be applied to judge the validity of the various ordinance restrictions. We are aided by this court's recent decision in Baldwin v. Redwood City et al., 540 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976) (reh. den. Sept. 14, 1976, pet. for cert. filed Oct. 12, 1976, 45 L.W. 3307), which dealt with a similar regulatory scheme. The Baldwin court…