Sierra Club, a California Non-Profit Corporation v. United States Postal Service

The Sierra Club, plaintiff in the district court, brings this appeal from an order of the district court granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 1 For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment below.

Prior to 1971, the Sierra Club enjoyed preferred second and third class mailing rates pursuant to 39 U.S.C. §§ 4358 and 4452, because it was considered an “educational” organization. In 1971, however, the Postal Service decided to discontinue the Sierra Club’s preferential rates. The Postal Service based this action upon an earlier determination of the Internal Revenue Service that the Sierra Club no longer qualified for a tax exemption under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [26 U.S.C.] § 501(c)(3), which applies to charitable and educational institutions. 2 The action was apparently founded on the assumption that *1201 the I.R.S., in revoking the Section 501(c)(3) exemption, found that the Sierra Club was no longer an “educational” organization.

Soon after the decision by the Postal Service not to continue the Sierra Club’s preferential treatment, the Sierra Club filed suit in the district court seeking review of the administrative action, injunctive…

specially concurring:

In a recent decision, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the Supreme Court relied on many of the same factors we mention today to determine that the due process clause does not require that, prior to the termination of social security disability benefit payments, the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. The Court noted that the following factors are to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking process:

The Court also noted that written submissions could be adequate in the pretermination phase under certain conditions.

The Court mentioned another factor which is often overlooked:

Id. at 349 , 96 S.Ct. at 909 .

Although I express no opinion on the adequacy of the postal regulations themselves, I feel that in the factual context of this case, consideration of the factors enumerated by the Court in Eldridge , combined with an examination of the opportunities that Sierra Club had to present evidence prior to the termination of its preferred status, indicate that it was afforded due process of law.

Even though Eldridge was entitled to judicial review before…

549 F.2d 1199 SIERRA CLUB, a California Non-Profit Corporation, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE et al., Appellees. No. 74-1830. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Dec. 15, 1976. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied March 21, 1977. 1 Clark W. Maser (argued), of Athearn, Chandler & Hoffman, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant. 2 George Christopher Stoll, Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), San Francisco, Cal., for appellees. 3 Before DUNIWAY and WRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and LUCAS, * District Judge. LUCAS, District Judge: 4 The Sierra Club, plaintiff in the district court, brings this appeal from an order of the district court granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. 1 For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment below. 5 Prior to 1971, the Sierra Club enjoyed preferred second and third class mailing rates pursuant to 39 U.S.C. §§ 4358 and 4452, because it was considered an "educational" organization. In 1971, however, the Postal Service decided to discontinue the Sierra Club's preferential rates. The Postal Service based this action upon an earlier determination of the Internal Revenue Service that the Sierra Club no longer…