This is an appeal from the district court’s denial of appellant Andy’s motion to dismiss for failure to meet the speedy trial standard of 18 U.S.C. § 5036 , as amended, and from the court’s adjudication of appellant as a juvenile delinquent for an assault with a deadly weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 .

Appellant, an Indian and a resident of the Yakima Indian Reservation in the state of Washington, conducted a lengthy beer-drinking party at his residence on the reservation. On the evening of January 2, 1976, with Dixon Yallup, Edward Ewell, and Lenora James present, appellant brought out a .22 caliber rifle, taking it outside of his residence to shoot at street lights. At one point appellant stated, “Make me a bet, I can hit that ear.” It appears that appellant then began firing shots at passing automobiles on the road near his home.

On the same night, Jesse Jaime was struck by a bullet while driving his car near the intersection of West Wapato and Campbell Roads in Yakima County, Washington. The intersection is immediately in front of appellant’s house. Neither Jaime nor his passenger saw who fired the shot as they quickly fled the scene. Jaime survived.

Indian police later that night went to appellant’s residence to take its occupants into custody. Appellant was booked by the County Sheriff, and held in the Yakima County Detention Center as a juvenile. A hearing was held in the state court in Washington on January 14, 1976, 12 days after the offense was committed. At that time the state court entered an order surrendering jurisdiction to the federal authorities effective on January 19, 1976.

On February 19, 1976, appellant came to trial. He moved to have the information against him dismissed for failure to meet the speedy trial standard of 18 U.S.C. § 5036 . The district court denied his motion and adjudicated him a juvenile delinquent for assault with a deadly weapon.

Appellant appeals from the denial of his motion to dismiss and from the ensuing judgment.

The key question on this appeal is whether the Government failed to bring the appellant to trial within the 30-day period set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 5036 , which provides:

Appellant contends that he was denied his right to a speedy trial because he was detained from January 2, 1976, until he was brought to trial on February 19, 1976, a period in excess of 30 days. The district court denied the motion because it decided that the 30-day period commenced as of the date that appellant’s federal detention began. The question is thus presented: What event or events triggered the running of the 30-day period described by Section 5036?

*1283 We read Section 5036 in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 5032 , as amended. In pertinent part, Section 5032 provides:

A construction of Section 5036 which would require the running of the 30-day period prior to the time that the United States could have proceeded against the juvenile makes neither practical nor statutory sense. The two provisions can be effectively harmonized, however, by holding that the 30-day period runs from (1) the date that the Attorney General certifies, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have certified, to the conditions stated in Section 5032, or (2) the date upon which the Government formally assumes jurisdiction over the juvenile, whichever event earlier occurs.

The juvenile was in constant pretrial custody, federal or state, from January 2, 1976, until he was brought to trial in the federal court on February 19, 1976.

A remand will be necessary to permit the district court to determine whether more than 30 days elapsed from the date that the prosecuting officer for the federal government could have certified to the conditions of Section 5032, acting with reasonable diligence, and the date upon which the appellant was brought to trial. In this connection, we observe that more than 30 days elapsed from the date upon which the state formally relinquished jurisdiction, and the date upon which the appellant was brought to trial.

The judgment is vacated and the cause is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed.