United States v. Rea Lyn Segal

Segal pleaded guilty to the fraudulent use of a fictitious name and address in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1342 and was placed on probation. The district court subsequently found that the terms of her probation had been violated, revoked probation and imposed a jail sentence to begin subsequent to a state sentence she was then serving. On appeal she raises two questions. She contends first that she was denied the protections guaranteed by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and Rule 11, Fed.R. Crim.P., which are claimed to apply to her probation revocation hearing and, second, that imposition of a sentence to run consecutive to a state sentence was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

I

After Segal’s guilty plea, sentencing was continued to allow preparation of a presentence report and to provide time for her to *1295 work out an acceptable plan for making restitution to persons she defrauded. Segal experienced difficulty complying with her payment plan and, ten months later, appeared in district court with her attorney for a report. After she and her attorney offered mitigating arguments, the district judge suspended imposition of sentence and…

dissenting:

The significant issue on this appeal is whether the record must show appellant’s awareness of the substantial rights she would waive by admitting she had violated the conditions of her probation. It is difficult to understand why the majority labors with such obvious difficulty to find a basis *1302 for denying appellant a procedural protection so effective and so easily afforded.

Because revocation of probation deprives the defendant of a liberty interest protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, probation may be revoked consistently with the Constitution only by due process of law. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). The “minimum requirements of due process” to which a probationer is entitled include (1) notice of the charges, (2) disclosure of the adverse evidence, (3) an opportunity to be heard and present evidence, (4) an opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, absent a finding of good cause not to allow it, (5) a neutral and detached tribunal, and (6) a written statement of the reasons for revocation and the evidence relied on. Id. at 786 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 .

Appellant, the majority states “does…

549 F.2d 1293 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rea Lyn SEGAL, Defendant-Appellant. No. 75-3297. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Feb. 2, 1977. William M. Goodman, Asst. Federal Public Defender (argued), of San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellant. Malcolm Stuart Segal, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), of San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee. Before BROWNING and WALLACE, Circuit Judges, and EAST, * District Judge. WALLACE, Circuit Judge: 1 Segal pleaded guilty to the fraudulent use of a fictitious name and address in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1342 and was placed on probation. The district court subsequently found that the terms of her probation had been violated, revoked probation and imposed a jail sentence to begin subsequent to a state sentence she was then serving. On appeal she raises two questions. She contends first that she was denied the protections guaranteed by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and Rule 11, Fed.R.Crim.P., which are claimed to apply to her probation revocation hearing and, second, that imposition of a sentence to run consecutive to a state sentence was an abuse of discretion. We…