United States v. Joseph John Segna

555 F.2d 226 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph John SEGNA, Defendant-Appellant. No. 76-1418. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. April 6, 1977. As Amended on Denial of Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc June 7, 1977. David M. Ochoa, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Phoenix, Ariz., argued for defendant-appellant. William C. Smitherman, U. S. Atty., Michael B. Scott, Asst. U. S. Atty., Phoenix, Ariz., argued, for plaintiff-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. Before WALLACE and SNEED, Circuit Judges, and Gray, * District Judge. WALLACE, Circuit Judge: 1 Segna, a non-Indian, shot and killed an Indian policeman on the Navajo Indian Reservation in Arizona. After a trial where the only contested issue was Segna's legal sanity at the time of the offense he was convicted of first degree murder. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 , 1152. Segna argues to us that the evidence was insufficient to prove his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt; that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury both on the meaning of "wrongfulness" as that word is used in the test of criminal responsibility and on the defendant's…

Segna, a non-Indian, shot and killed an Indian policeman on the Navajo Indian Reservation in Arizona. After a trial where the only contested issue was Segna’s legal sanity at the time of the *229 offense he was convicted of first degree murder. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 , 1152. Segna argues to us that the evidence was insufficient to prove his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt; that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury both on the meaning of “wrongfulness” as that word is used in the test of criminal responsibility and on the defendant’s post-acquittal status; that prosecutorial misconduct in trial tactics 1 and closing arguments requires a new trial; and that certain of the district court’s evidentiary rulings were erroneous. We find the government’s evidence of sanity sufficient to sustain the conviction, but because part of the prosecutor’s unobjected-to closing argument constitutes plain error, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

I

Segna introduced substantial evidence that he was not legally responsible for the killing because of a mental disease or defect. This evidence consisted of the testimony of three psychiatrists, one psychologist and several lay…

concurring and dissenting:

I agree that the conviction must be reversed for the reason asserted in the opinion of the court. However, in light of all of the evidence presented at the trial, I do not see how any reasonable jury could possibly have found beyond reasonable doubt that Segna was sane. It is true that Dr. Gor-man testified to a contrary conclusion, but most of the factual assumptions upon which his opinion rested were thoroughly destroyed, and his “rather far-fetched speculation” to which the majority opinion refers bordered on the incredible. I think that a directed verdict on the insanity issue was indicated.

Also, it seems to me that one aspect of the prosecutor’s conduct deserves more attention than has thus far been accorded it in the opinion (see footnote No. 1). There was never any issue as to the fact that Segna shot and killed the decedent police officer shortly after the latter and a fellow officer drove in their patrol car to the scene of a disturbance that Segna had created.

Nonetheless, the prosecutor called as his first witness the widow of the decedent and began his interrogation by asking her if she was married (!). She responded that she was a widow…