United States v. Harold E. Smith

Appellant Harold E. Smith was found guilty of criminal contempt in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 42 and 18 U.S.C. § 401 and was sentenced to sixty days imprisonment. He raises four points on appeal: first, that in convicting him the trial court improperly applied a less exacting standard of intent; second, that the application of this less rigid standard deprived him of his First Amendment rights; third, that even under this standard his actions did not constitute criminal contempt; and fourth, that his punishment was excessive. For the reasons set out below we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, James Walter Scott and Gregory Scott were spectators at the trial of William Gardiner for failure to file income tax returns and for wilfully supplying false and fraudulent information to his employer on a withholding exemption certificate. They shared Gardiner’s view that the income tax laws are unconstitutional. Prior to the noon recess, the court admonished the jury not to discuss the case among themselves or with others. Appellant was present in court at this time and heard this admonition.

During the noon recess, the three crossed the lobby of the courthouse and, in…

concurring:

Appellant has been convicted of criminal contempt pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1) for obstruction of the administration of justice. As with most crimes, criminal contempt occurs only when there is a concurrence of a prohibited act and some form of criminal intent. Cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-52 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). This case requires an articulation of the precise nature of both of these elements of the offense. I agree that a conviction for criminal contempt in the context of this case cannot be based on a communication made solely with “wilful and wanton disregard of whether the jurors might hear it.” However, the standard for determining what conduct is prohibited merits further explication.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1) prohibits misbehavior which rises to the level of an obstruction of the administration of justice. I do not agree that this element of the offense is satisfied merely because Smith’s conversations “had the tendency to influence improperly the actions of the jury.” Because the allegedly contemptuous conduct is comprised solely of speech, it is my view that a “tendency to influence” standard of wrongful conduct…

555 F.2d 249 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harold E. SMITH, Defendant-Appellant. No. 76-3327. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. June 8, 1977. Thomas M. Schneiger, Federal Defender Section, Metropolitan Public Defender, Portland, Or., argued, for defendant-appellant. Marc D. Blackman, Asst. U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., argued for plaintiff-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. Before MERRILL and SNEED, Circuit Judges, and BLUMENFELD, * District Judge. SNEED, Circuit Judge: 1 Appellant Harold E. Smith was found guilty of criminal contempt in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 42 and 18 U.S.C. § 401 and was sentenced to sixty days imprisonment. He raises four points on appeal: first, that in convicting him the trial court improperly applied a less exacting standard of intent; second, that the application of this less rigid standard deprived him of his First Amendment rights; third, that even under this standard his actions did not constitute criminal contempt; and fourth, that his punishment was excessive. For the reasons set out below we reverse the judgment of the trial court. 2 Appellant, James Walter Scott…