United States v. John Patrick Marron

The appeal raises the questions (1) whether a district court may legally sentence a 20-year-old youth offender to a split sentence of time and probation to follow, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651 and 5010(b); and (2) if not, whether the district court may revoke the probation and sentence to custody. We hold the probation sentence was illegal, but the district court could revoke probation and legally sentence the defendant under § 5010(b). We affirm.

Defendant pled guilty to a charge of making and forging an endorsement of a check payable solely from funds of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 495 . The court, on April 2, 1976, found the defendant was 20 years of age and was “suitable for handling under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (Y.C.A.), 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-24 , as a young adult offender.” 1 The court then sentenced the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General “for imprisonment for a term of three (3) years; and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3651 , on condition that the defendant be confined in . a jail-type institution for a period of thirty days,” consisting of 48-hour weekends, “the execution of the remainder of the sentence of imprisonment is hereby suspended and…

dissenting:

While I must agree with the majority that the sentence first imposed was illegal, I wish to comment on the line of Youth Corrections Act (YCA) cases, Hayes, Mollet, and Bowens, which compel that conclusion. And I dissent from the court’s subsequent disposition of the case for the reasons indicated.

I.

In United States v. Hayes, 474 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1973), this court held that where a young offender is committed to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision under 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (b), the commitment can not be coupled with a fine. The court’s interpretation of the UCA on that narrow issue seems to me to be at least arguably correct, even if it is not necessarily compelled by a reading of the statute. 1 The opinion, however, laid down a broader rule which I believe to be unfortunate, to the effect that under the Act “a combination of rehabilitative treatment and retributive punishment is not intended and is improper.

The next in this line of cases was United States v. Mollet, 510 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1975). There, one defendant had been fined and committed to custody under § 5010(b), but in effect given a split sentence: he was to serve six…

564 F.2d 867 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Patrick MARRON, Defendant-Appellant. No. 77-1682. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Nov. 14, 1977. Randi Wood, Missoula, Mont., for defendant-appellant. Robert L. Zimmerman, Asst. U. S. Atty., Billings, Mont., for plaintiff-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana. Before CARTER and TRASK, Circuit Judges, and BURNS, * District Judge. JAMES M. CARTER, Circuit Judge: 1 The appeal raises the questions (1) whether a district court may legally sentence a 20-year-old youth offender to a split sentence of time and probation to follow, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651 and 5010(b); and (2) if not, whether the district court may revoke the probation and sentence to custody. We hold the probation sentence was illegal, but the district court could revoke probation and legally sentence the defendant under § 5010(b). We affirm. 2 Defendant pled guilty to a charge of making and forging an endorsement of a check payable solely from funds of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 495 . The court, on April 2, 1976, found the defendant was 20 years of age and…