Velazco-Hernandez appeals from a district court order denying his motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence. We affirm.

On July 11,1977, appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of smuggling merchandise into the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545 . The district court sentenced him orally as follows:

On July 12, 1977 the written judgment of the court was filed stating that the defendant was committed to the custody of the Attorney General

Appellant contends that there is a variance between the oral sentence pronounced and the written judgment and so the oral pronouncement made in his presence must control, citing United States v. Munoz-Dela Rosa, 495 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1974) involving oral concurrent sentences which the court sought to alter to consecutive sentences in its subsequent written judgment. We held that the unambiguous oral sentence controlled, there being a direct conflict between it and the written judgment.

Here, however, there is no conflict between the oral and the written edicts, any difference between them being of form rather than substance.

Appellant further contends that probation cannot be conditioned upon service of a portion of a sentence of imprisonment — that such a condition is void. In support of this contention he cites Watkins v. Merry, 106 F.2d 360, 361 (10th Cir. 1939) and White v. Burke, 43 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1930). Both of those cases construed and applied a section of the Probation Act (then 18 U.S.C. § 724 , et seq.) which Congress amended in 1958 by Pub.L.No. 85-741, 72 Stat. 834 ( 18 U.S.C. § 3651 ) which in pertinent part now reads:

(Emphasis supplied.) Since § 3651 permits “incarceration in a jail-type institution for a period of time as a further condition of probation,” United States v. Mollet, 510 F.2d 625, 628 (9th Cir. 1975), appellant’s argument fails.

AFFIRMED.