Ramona HOLLOWAY, Appellant, v. ARTHUR ANDERSEN AND COMPANY, Appellee

566 F.2d 659 16 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 689 , 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8059 Ramona HOLLOWAY, Appellant, v. ARTHUR ANDERSEN AND COMPANY, Appellee. No. 76-2248. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Dec. 23, 1977. 1 Howard J. De Nike, of De Nike & Hickman, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant. 2 Victoria S. Diaz, of Pillsbury, Madison, & Sutro, San Francisco, Cal., for appellee. 3 Appeal from the United States District Court, Northern District of California. 4 Before GOODWIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and NIELSEN, * District Judge. NIELSEN, District Judge: 5 Appellant, Ramona Holloway, a transsexual, claims that appellee, Arthur Andersen and Company, an accounting firm, discriminated against her in employment on account of her sex and has therefore violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Appellant appeals from the trial court's judgment granting Andersen's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court determined that Title VII does not embrace transsexual discrimination. We AFFIRM. 6 * Holloway was first employed by Arthur Andersen in 1969 and was then known as Robert Holloway. In 1970, appellant…

Appellant, Ramona Holloway, a transsexual, claims that appellee, Arthur Andersen and Company, an accounting firm, discriminated against her in employment on account of her sex and has therefore violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Appellant appeals from the trial court’s judgment granting Andersen’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court determined that Title'-VII does not embrace transsex-ual — discriminaficmr AFFIRM.

I

Holloway was first employed by Arthur Andersen in 1969 and was then known as Robert fíojloway. In 1970, appellant began to receive female hormone treatments. In February of 1974, appellant was promoted to the position of Head Multilith Operator. At this time, appellant informed Marion D. Passard, her supervisor, that appellant was undergoing treatment in preparation for anatomical sex change surgery. In June of 1974, during 'añfraal 'review, an official of the company suggested that appellant would be happier at a,.new-4eb-where-dier transsexualism would be unknown. However, Holloway was still given a pay raise.

In November, 1974, at her request, Holloway’s records were changed to…

dissenting:

While I agree with the majority in the belief that Congress probably never contemplated that Title VII would apply to transsexuals, I dissent from the decision that the statute affords such plaintiffs no benefit. I would not limit the right to claim discrimination to those who were born into the victim class.

The only issue before us is whether a transsexual whose condition has not yet become stationary can state a claim under the statute if discharged because of her undertaking to change her sex. I read from the language of the statute itself that she can.

This is not a “sexual preference” case; this is a case of a person completing surgically that part of nature’s handiwork which apparently was left incomplete somewhere along the line.

By its language, the statute proscribes discrimination among employees because of their sex. When a transsexual completes his or her transition from one sexual identity to another, that person will have a sexual classification. Assuming that this plaintiff has now undergone her planned surgery, she is, presumably, female, at least for most social purposes.

This plaintiff alleges that she was discharged from employment while she…