16 Fair empl.prac.cas. 396, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8046 Van Davis v. County of Los Angeles, Etc., Van Davis v. County of Los Angeles, Etc.

Bad Law
566 F.2d 1334
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJanuary 30, 197873-3008 and 73-3009California24,438 words

Opinion

Opinion

566 F.2d 1334 16 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 396 , 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8046 Van DAVIS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., etc., Defendants-Appellees. Van DAVIS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., etc., Defendants-Appellants. Nos. 73-3008 and 73-3009. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Dec. 14, 1977. Rehearing Denied Jan. 30, 1978. A. Thomas Hunt (argued), of Center for Law in the Public Interest, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellants. William F. Stewart (argued), Stephen Reinhardt (argued), Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants-appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Before TUTTLE, * HUFSTEDLER and WALLACE, Circuit Judges. TUTTLE, Circuit Judge: 1 This Court entered its original opinion in this case on October 20, 1976. The Court thereafter granted defendants-cross-appellants' motion for rehearing, and the case was regularly set down for rehearing and oral argument. Although the principal basis for the rehearing motion was the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), the parties were permitted to brief…

lead Opinion

Tuttle, J.

This Court entered its original opinion in this case on October 20, 1976. The Court thereafter granted defendants-cross-appellants’ motion for rehearing, and the case was regularly set down for rehearing and oral argument. Although the principal basis for the rehearing motion was the Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), the parties were permitted to brief and argue all other issues as well.

We now withdraw the original opinion and decision, and this opinion and decision are announced in their stead.

This suit was brought on behalf of all present and future black and Mexican-American applicants for positions as firemen with the Los Angeles County Fire Department, 1 alleging that the defendants Los Angeles County, the County Board of Supervisors and the County Civil Service Commission had been guilty of racial discrimination in hiring in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 , 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 2

The district court found that the Los Angeles County Fire Department employed blacks and Mexican-Americans grossly out of proportion to their…

dissent Opinion

Wallace, J.

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

Discrimination in employment based upon race, creed or color is a practice inconsistent with the views and aspirations of nearly all Americans and clearly repugnant to the principles upon which our society is built. But even in rooting out such an evil practice, we are bound by certain procedural and jurisdictional limitations which may serve to protect the rights of others.

I think it is clear from the record that the plaintiffs’ challenges to two of the three allegedly illegal employment practices are barred by such a jurisdictional limitation. The majority concedes that the named plaintiffs have no standing to attack the defendants’ pre-1971 hiring procedures. I agree. I believe it equally plain that they lack standing to challenge the height limitation.

As to the remedy, I conclude that while the plaintiffs may well have standing to challenge the post-1971 hiring procedures, there is a critical issue as to whether the imposition of minority hiring quotas is now warranted given the limited scope of this issue and the circumstances under which the defendants’ objectionable conduct occurred. Because the district 1 court imposed quotas based…

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