dissenting:

In finding that Powell was not covered by the Act, the majority focuses upon his employment status at the time of the accident and concludes that his activities were “more oriented to the rails than to the sea.” Believing that Powell’s status at the time of the accident was identical to Caputo’s in the overall process of loading and unloading, although performed at different ends of the spectrum, I respectfully dissent.

It should be noted that in Northeast Marine Terminal, supra, the Supreme Court, by focusing on the fact that Caputo could have been assigned to any one of a number of “longshoring” tasks on the day of his injury, did not have to decide the issue before this panel, i. e., whether Caputo’s specific unloading task was covered under the Act. However, in my opinion, the Court indicated that that part of Caputo’s job would be covered, even if the other tasks performed were not indisputably longshoring operations.

First of all, the Court rejected the point of rest theory as too restrictive. From this it is clear that coverage, in the case of loading, is extended beyond the point where the stevedoring operation begins and the terminal operation ends. The Court also reiterated the only example of work, found in the legislative history that Congress intended to exclude — employees “whose responsibility is only to pick up stored cargo for further transshipment.” At 275, n. 37, 97 S.Ct. at 2363. The Court found that this example did not refer to Caputo, but is limited to “workers such as the consignee’s truck drivers Caputo was helping, whose presence at the pier or terminal is for the purpose of picking up cargo for further shipment by land transportation.” At 274- *565 275, n. 37, 97 S.Ct. at 2363. By analogy to Caputo’s job, this example does not pertain to Powell. The purpose of Powell’s presence at the terminal was not that of delivering cargo for further shipment by sea, but rather to initiate the process whereby this delivered cargo was loaded onto a ship. 1 Powell’s function was identical to Caputo’s in the overall process of loading and unloading, with the only difference being that their jobs were performed at different ends of the spectrum.

I am also persuaded by the fact that the Supreme Court repeatedly noted that the Act should be liberally construed, both because the language “engaged in maritime employment” is broad, and because the Act is remedial legislation. The Court noted that this broad language “suggests that we should take an expansive view of the extended coverage” since “such a construction is appropriate for this remedial legislation.” At 268, 97 S.Ct. at 2359. I believe that a liberal construction supports the Board’s finding “that the claimant’s duties of unloading grain . . . was the beginning step of a longshoring operation in maritime employment.” I believe that to hold otherwise would be to return to the “hop-scotch” effect that the 1972 amendments were designed to eliminate.

The Petition for Review should be denied.