Graves, formerly a probationary schoolteacher in Ganado, Arizona, brought a civil rights action against the superintendent of the school district and members of the school board after her teaching contract was not renewed. According to the letter notifying Graves of the board’s decision, the reasons for the action was:

Graves complained that the termination violated her constitutional rights of privacy and association. In addition, she contended that the failure of the board to grant her a hearing violated her right to due process. The district court ordered the parties to select an impartial panel from among members of the education community to hold a hearing, determine the facts and make a recommendation to the board. The board was to reconsider the matter in light of the *224 findings of the panel, giving reasons for its final decision. A majority of the panel found “no proof” of misconduct on the part of Graves and recommended that she be rehired. The board stood by its original decision. The court granted summary judgment for defendants and Graves appeals.

Graves argues that she was not accorded sufficient due process. The district court concluded that the reasons for not renewing her contract infringed on her interest in liberty under the 14th amendment. In light of Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349 , 96 S.Ct. 2074 , 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) and Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627-628, 97 S.Ct. 882, 883-884 , 51 L.Ed.2d 92, 96-97 (1977), we are not so certain. The district court did not have the benefit of these cases when it ruled. However, we do not decide this case on that ground.

Where liberty interests are involved, the only purpose of a hearing is to give the injured employee an opportunity to clear her name. Codd v. Velger, supra. Under the facts of our case, a posttermination hearing was adequate to protect the liberty interest of Graves. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283 , 97 S.Ct. 568, 573 , 50 L.Ed.2d 471, 481 (1977). The district court did not err in failing to reinstate Graves with back pay pending a hearing.

And the district court properly left the board with the ultimate decision whether to rehire her. Where a nontenured employee has been stigmatized by a termination, the scope of the hearing is limited to whether the allegations of misconduct are true. Codd v. Velger, supra. Assuming a liberty interest is involved, Graves was entitled to a hearing to establish that the innuendo was wrong. But she was not entitled to a hearing to decide whether under all the circumstances her contract should have been renewed. She had no property interest in continued employment. Therefore once she had an opportunity to clear herself of any suggestion of impropriety, the constitutional concept of due process would not be offended if the board denied her future employment for other reasons or for no reason. See Codd v. Velger, supra; Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 573 n. 12, 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).

Nor do we agree that the board’s actions in rejecting the recommendation of a majority of the panel violated Graves’ right to due process. The panel concluded there was “no incontrovertible evidence” of improper conduct by Graves. In light of the equivocal way the report of the majority is drafted, the board did not violate her right of due process in the course of rejecting the recommendation of a majority of the panel. However, to lessen or avoid any stigma that might otherwise attach to Graves’ teaching record, the board should clean up its minutes. This can be done by expunging from its minutes, records and reports all references to reasons or grounds for failing to rehire Graves.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on her cause of action for violation of her right to privacy. This case involves no direct attempt to regulate private conduct. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 , 92 S.Ct. 1029 , 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 , 96 S.Ct. 2586 , 49 L.Ed.2d 415 (1976).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs to defendants under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d).

Judgment in favor of defendants is AFFIRMED. The case is remanded for action by the board consistent with this opinion.