In 1975 the California legislature passed section 21200 of the California Business & Professions Code (chapter 8) to regulate price discrimination by major distributors of motor fuel. The first paragraph of chapter 8, in language paralleling section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (1970), prohibits price discrimination where the effect of such discrimination is to lessen competition. The second paragraph of chapter 8, like section 2(b) of the federal statute, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (b), provides a “meeting competition” defense. The defense under the California statute, however, is narrower than that under the federal statute. To be exculpated under the state act, a discriminating seller must prove not only that the lower price was offered in good faith to meet the equally low price of a competitor, which is all the federal statute requires, but also that the lower price was offered to all customers of the seller in competition with the favored purchaser.

Appellee brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief contending that, because of the limited “meeting competition” defense, the state act is in conflict with section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act and therefore unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. The district court agreed, and granted summary judgment declaring the state statute void and of no effect. This appeal followed.

Appellee originally argued broadly that the California statute is in conflict with the Robinson-Patman Act (1) because the California statute requires a seller to grant a lower price to customers other than the one who received a lower price from a competitor of the seller, and thus compels the seller to violate the Robinson-Patman Act which protects discriminatory price reductions only to the customer who has received a price offer from the competing seller; and (2) because the California statute deprives the seller of a federally guaranteed right to defend against customer raids by a price reduction limited to the particular customer to whom the competitor has offered a lower price.

The Supreme Court rejected the premise of both of these arguments in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 , 98 S.Ct. 2207 , 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978). The Court said:

Attempting to escape the force of Exxon, appellees now argue that the anti-competitive effects of chapter 8 conflict with the Sherman Act policy favoring price competition. Exxon disposes of this argument as well:

Id. at 133-134 , 98 S.Ct. at 2217-18 (footnote omitted).

Appellees suggest that Exxon is distinguishable because the anticompetitive effects of chapter 8 are more severe — and thus more in conflict with the federal policy of price competition — than the effects of the Maryland statute upheld in Exxon. Assuming appellees correctly analyze the potential effect of chapter 8, this difference in the degree of impact on competition does not support an inference of preemption where none was warranted in Exxon.

The decision of the California Supreme Court in Rica v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 21 Cal.3d 431 , 146 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 579 P.2d 476 (1978), is hardly “dispositive of the issue on this appeal,” as appellees contend. As a statement of state law it is inapplicable here. As an exposition of federal law it cannot supplant Exxon.

Reversed.

. Four differences are cited: that chapter 8 extends to permanent price reductions, while the Maryland statute applied only to temporary ones; that chapter 8, unlike the Maryland law, covers price concessions on bulk and wholesale fuel sales as well as sales to retail service stations; that chapter 8 applies to gasoline flowing in interstate as well as intrastate commerce; and that chapter 8 limits the duration of “meeting competition” price reductions to one year.